View source for The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945

{{Infobox book
| name           = The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945	

| author         = Jay W. Baird
| publisher      = University of Minnesota Press
| pub_date       = 1974
| pages          = 329
| isbn           = 0816607419
| image          = [[File:baird mythical cover.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

“Nazi propaganda,” argues Jay Baird, “was unique in the way it merged the practical and political with the mythical.” (p. 3) What Baird means by “mythical” is left for the reader to discern, but it is nonetheless a thorough study with a cogent narrative. The stated goal of the book is to “analyze the development of Nazi propaganda during World War II as a function of Party ideology.” (p. 4) To this end, Baird deftly describes Goebbels’ direction of Nazi propaganda, along with its shifts in tone and nuance, from the invasion of Poland to the demise of the Third Reich.

The chief goal of Nazi propaganda was to elevate Hitler to the status of a demigod. This trope is especially apparent during the invasion of Poland, where Hitler seemed to be constantly at the front. Other figures of the Third Reich appeared in propaganda. Erwin Rommel, of course, is the most famous example, but they also praised General Eduard Dietl during the invasion of Norway. Other officers, such as U-Boat captains, were praised as well, but they were always second to Hitler, who was lauded as “the greatest military commander of all time” during the invasion of France.” (pp. 96-97)

Next to Hitler, propaganda emphasized the unity between “front and Heimat” as a way to accentuate the strength of the German racial community. German soldiers were the product of a superior race, which was embodied in everything Germans did (in support of the regime). This theme became especially prominent during the battle of Stalingrad and its aftermath, when Baird argues that “the sacrifice along the Volga could be explained only by way of a myth.” (p. 184)

Instead of reporting surrender, propaganda declared that the German defenders of Stalingrad fought to the last man. The event marked a turning point, where Goebbels’ campaigns became more and more divorced from reality as the war progressed. Nazi propaganda declared the fighting in North Africa to be a complete strategic success after Axis forces surrendered practically ''en masse''. As the Reich’s fortunes eclipsed further, Goebbels’ tried to inspire the German people to fanatical levels of resistance, while assuring them that victory was near.

Notions of international Jewish conspiracy were never far beneath the surface of Nazi propaganda. “The Jews, the English, and the Poles”, for instance, were, according to Baird, “the Reich’s enemies, in descending order, during the German-Polish war.” (p. 41) British and American ‘plutocrats’ were tools of an international Jewish cabal, dead set on destroying the German nation and enslaving its people. A victory by Germany’s “Judeo-Bolshevik” enemies to the east meant unmitigated racial disaster. This theme was stressed in the summer of 1941, and became amplified as the Red Army pushed closer to Berlin.

Baird is especially clever in his assessment of Nazi propaganda’s effectiveness. Using SD reports—which he argues “were a much more reliable indicator of public opinion”—Baird shows the ebb and flow of Germans’ susceptibility to Goebbels’ narratives. (p. 39) Belief in propaganda hewed closely to Germany’s fortunes on the battlefield. Support for the invasion of France was widespread, which initially translated into optimism during the Battle of Britain. Few Germans, however, believed propaganda narratives about Stalingrad, where letters that somehow escaped field censors told of a very different situation. The contrast between Nazi propaganda’s increasing stridency and the progressively grim state of the war even led some Germans to doubt factual accounts of Soviet atrocities against German civilians.

Baird’s study is convincing. He has sidestepped the major challenge of studying Nazi propaganda—that many of the records for the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda were destroyed by Allied bombs—by interviewing former personnel within the Ministry itself. Still, his work raises a couple of questions. For one: if, despite Nazi propaganda, many Germans accepted that Germany was losing the war, did they actually believe that the Jews were behind the destruction?

Next, how does Baird define “myth”? He comes closest when he describes the “myth of Stalingrad” as an effort “to replace an unfortunate reality with a ‘new reality.’” (p. 190) But is this all that myth is? This is not to say Baird seems to use the term inappropriately, but a clearer definition would have helped. Nonetheless, ''The Mythical World of Nazi Propaganda'' is a terrific primer to a complex topic, and tells a compelling story of Joseph Goebbels’ tireless efforts to conform public perceptions to pure ideology. 

[[Category:Modern European History]]

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