Videri - User contributions [en]

The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945

2019-11-15T22:57:38Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945

| author = Jay W. Baird
| publisher = University of Minnesota Press
| pub_date = 1974
| pages = 329
| isbn = 0816607419
| image = [[File:baird mythical cover.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

“Nazi propaganda,” argues Jay Baird, “was unique in the way it merged the practical and political with the mythical.” (p. 3) What Baird means by “mythical” is left for the reader to discern, but it is nonetheless a thorough study with a cogent narrative. The stated goal of the book is to “analyze the development of Nazi propaganda during World War II as a function of Party ideology.” (p. 4) To this end, Baird deftly describes Goebbels’ direction of Nazi propaganda, along with its shifts in tone and nuance, from the invasion of Poland to the demise of the Third Reich.

The chief goal of Nazi propaganda was to elevate Hitler to the status of a demigod. This trope is especially apparent during the invasion of Poland, where Hitler seemed to be constantly at the front. Other figures of the Third Reich appeared in propaganda. Erwin Rommel, of course, is the most famous example, but they also praised General Eduard Dietl during the invasion of Norway. Other officers, such as U-Boat captains, were praised as well, but they were always second to Hitler, who was lauded as “the greatest military commander of all time” during the invasion of France.” (pp. 96-97)

Next to Hitler, propaganda emphasized the unity between “front and Heimat” as a way to accentuate the strength of the German racial community. German soldiers were the product of a superior race, which was embodied in everything Germans did (in support of the regime). This theme became especially prominent during the battle of Stalingrad and its aftermath, when Baird argues that “the sacrifice along the Volga could be explained only by way of a myth.” (p. 184)

Instead of reporting surrender, propaganda declared that the German defenders of Stalingrad fought to the last man. The event marked a turning point, where Goebbels’ campaigns became more and more divorced from reality as the war progressed. Nazi propaganda declared the fighting in North Africa to be a complete strategic success after Axis forces surrendered practically ''en masse''. As the Reich’s fortunes eclipsed further, Goebbels’ tried to inspire the German people to fanatical levels of resistance, while assuring them that victory was near.

Notions of international Jewish conspiracy were never far beneath the surface of Nazi propaganda. “The Jews, the English, and the Poles”, for instance, were, according to Baird, “the Reich’s enemies, in descending order, during the German-Polish war.” (p. 41) British and American ‘plutocrats’ were tools of an international Jewish cabal, dead set on destroying the German nation and enslaving its people. A victory by Germany’s “Judeo-Bolshevik” enemies to the east meant unmitigated racial disaster. This theme was stressed in the summer of 1941, and became amplified as the Red Army pushed closer to Berlin.

Baird is especially clever in his assessment of Nazi propaganda’s effectiveness. Using SD reports—which he argues “were a much more reliable indicator of public opinion”—Baird shows the ebb and flow of Germans’ susceptibility to Goebbels’ narratives. (p. 39) Belief in propaganda hewed closely to Germany’s fortunes on the battlefield. Support for the invasion of France was widespread, which initially translated into optimism during the Battle of Britain. Few Germans, however, believed propaganda narratives about Stalingrad, where letters that somehow escaped field censors told of a very different situation. The contrast between Nazi propaganda’s increasing stridency and the progressively grim state of the war even led some Germans to doubt factual accounts of Soviet atrocities against German civilians.

Baird’s study is convincing. He has sidestepped the major challenge of studying Nazi propaganda—that many of the records for the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda were destroyed by Allied bombs—by interviewing former personnel within the Ministry itself. Still, his work raises a couple of questions. For one: if, despite Nazi propaganda, many Germans accepted that Germany was losing the war, did they actually believe that the Jews were behind the destruction?

Next, how does Baird define “myth”? He comes closest when he describes the “myth of Stalingrad” as an effort “to replace an unfortunate reality with a ‘new reality.’” (p. 190) But is this all that myth is? This is not to say Baird seems to use the term inappropriately, but a clearer definition would have helped. Nonetheless, ''The Mythical World of Nazi Propaganda'' is a terrific primer to a complex topic, and tells a compelling story of Joseph Goebbels’ tireless efforts to conform public perceptions to pure ideology.

[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Jean-Denis Bredin]]

File:Baird mythical cover.jpg

2019-11-15T22:51:29Z

Ueberaffe:

The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945

2019-11-15T22:50:08Z

Ueberaffe: Created page with "{{Infobox book | name = The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945 | author = Jay W. Baird | publisher = University of Minnesota Press | pub..."

{{Infobox book
| name = The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945

| author = Jay W. Baird
| publisher = University of Minnesota Press
| pub_date = 1974
| pages = 329
| isbn = 0816607419
| image = [[File:baird mythical cover.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

“Nazi propaganda,” argues Jay Baird, “was unique in the way it merged the practical and political with the mythical.” (p. 3) What Baird means by “mythical” is left for the reader to discern, but it is nonetheless a thorough study with a cogent narrative. The stated goal of the book is to “analyze the development of Nazi propaganda during World War II as a function of Party ideology.” (p. 4) To this end, Baird deftly describes Goebbels’ direction of Nazi propaganda, along with its shifts in tone and nuance, from the invasion of Poland to the demise of the Third Reich.

The chief goal of Nazi propaganda was to elevate Hitler to the status of a demigod. This trope is especially apparent during the invasion of Poland, where Hitler seemed to be constantly at the front. Other figures of the Third Reich appeared in propaganda. Erwin Rommel, of course is the most famous example, but they also praised General Eduard during the invasion of Norway. Other officers, such as U-Boat captains, were praised as well, but they were always second to Hitler, who was lauded as “the greatest military commander of all time” during the invasion of France.” (pp. 96-97)

Next to Hitler, propaganda emphasized the unity between “front and Heimat” as a way to accentuate the strength of the German racial community. German soldiers were the product of a superior race, which was embodied in everything Germans did (in support of the regime). This theme became especially prominent during the battle of Stalingrad and its aftermath, when Baird argues that “the sacrifice along the Volga could be explained only by way of a myth.” (p. 184)

Instead of reporting surrender, propaganda declared that the German defenders of Stalingrad fought to the last man. The event marked a turning point, where Goebbels’ campaigns became more and more divorced from reality as the war progressed. Nazi propaganda declared the fighting in North Africa to be a complete strategic success after Axis forces surrendered practically en masse. As the Reich’s fortunes eclipsed further, Goebbels’ tried to inspire the German people to fanatical levels of resistance, while assuring them that victory was near.

Notions of international Jewish conspiracy were never far beneath the surface of Nazi propaganda. “The Jews, the English, and the Poles”, for instance, were, according to Baird “the Reich’s enemies, in descending order, during the German-Polish war.” (p. 41) British and American ‘plutocrats’ were tools of an international Jewish cabal, dead set on destroying the German nation and enslaving its people. A victory by Germany’s “Judeo-Bolshevik” enemies to the east meant unmitigated racial disaster. This theme was stressed in the summer of 1941, and became amplified as the Red Army pushed closer to Berlin.

Baird is especially clever in his assessment of Nazi propaganda’s effectiveness. Using SD reports—which he argues “were a much more reliable indicator of public opinion”—Baird shows the ebb and flow of Germans’ susceptibility to Goebbels’ narratives. (p. 39) This reading of SD reports indicates that belief in propaganda hewed closely to Germany’s fortunes on the battlefield. Support for the invasion of France was widespread, which initially translated into optimism during the Battle of Britain. Few Germans, however, believed propaganda narratives about Stalingrad, where letters that somehow escaped field censors told of a very different situation. The contrast between Nazi propaganda’s increasing stridence and the progressively grim state of the war even led some Germans to doubt factual accounts of Soviet atrocities against German civilians.

Baird’s study is convincing. He has sidestepped the major challenge of studying Nazi propaganda—that many of the records for the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda were destroyed by Allied bombs—by interviewing former personnel within the Ministry itself. Still, his work raises a couple of questions. For one: if, despite Nazi propaganda, many Germans accepted that Germany was losing the war, did they actually believe that the Jews were behind the destruction?

Next, how does Baird define “myth”? He comes closest when he describes the “myth of Stalingrad” as an effort “to replace an unfortunate reality with a ‘new reality.’” (p. 190) But is this all that myth is? This is not to say Baird seems to use the term inappropriately, but a clearer definition would have helped. Nonetheless, The Mythical World of Nazi Propaganda is a terrific primer to a complex topic, and tells a compelling story of Joseph Goebbels’ tireless efforts to conform public perceptions to pure ideology.

[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Jean-Denis Bredin]]

Modern European History

2019-11-15T22:44:58Z

Ueberaffe:

==Reading Lists==
* [[Old Regime and Revolutionary France, ca. 1650-1800 - Perl-Rosenthal]]

==Book Summaries==
* Jay W. Baird. [[The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945]] (1974)
* Jean-Denis Bredin. [[The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus]] (1986)
* M. Brady Brower. [[Unruly Spirits: The Science of Scientific Phenomena in Modern France]] (2010)
* James M. Diehl. [[The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War]] (1993)
* Isabel V. Hull. [[Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany]] (2005)
* Jay Lockenour. [[Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955]] (2001)
* John Merriman. [[The Dynamite Club|The Dynamite Club: How A Bombing in Fin-de-Siecle Paris Ignited the Age of Modern Terror]] (2009)
* Robert G. Moeller. [[War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany]] (2001)
* Frederic Morton. [[A Nervous Splendor: 1888-1889]] (1979)
* Carl E. Schorske. [[Fin-de-Siècle Vienna| Fin-de-Siècle Vienna - Politics and Culture]] (1981)
* Alaric Searl. [[Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959]] (2003)
* Debora Silverman. [[Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology and Style]] (1992)
* Eugen Weber. [[Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914]] (1976)

Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955

2019-10-19T20:00:53Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Soldiers as Citizens:Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955

| author = Jay Lockenour
| publisher = University of Nebraska Press
| pub_date = 2001
| pages = 255
| isbn = 0803229402
| image = [[File:Soldiers as Citizens.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

In Soldiers as Citizens, Jay Lockenour examines the ways in which former Wehrmacht officers searched for a place in West Germany and the emerging Cold War order. What is striking is that, unlike their Weimar-era counterparts, these veterans ultimately integrated themselves into the burgeoning democracy of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Even more remarkable, is the fact that this integration occurred despite a shared sense of alienation and longing for order. For Lockenour, this process strikes at the heart of the postwar stability of the BRD. “The process by which these officers came to espouse democracy and ‘Western’ values in the aftermath of World War II,” he argues, “is key to understanding the Federal Republic of Germany.” (p. 9)

Yet integration faced steep odds. To much of the West German public, former Wehrmacht officers were a reminder of a lost war and a discredited Third Reich. Moreover, these men were denied pensions because the occupying Allies feared that special treatment of former officers bred the sort of militarism that had started the war in the first place. These two issues, “defamation” of veterans and the loss of pensions, promoted a sense of unity among former officers, galvanizing them into political action.

Despite the fact that veteran groups were initially banned by the Allies, former officers organized with alacrity, circumventing the law when necessary. For instance, veterans’ leagues often recruited women and family members to give the appearance of a broader base. It was, ironically, this kind of political action that ultimately made former officers receptive to democracy. “By 1953,” writes Lockenour, “former officers and their organizations had learned the language of democracy and had gone to great lengths to cooperate with the Federal Republic’s own variation of Gleichschaltung (coordination).” (p. 62) Political organization taught veterans the language of democracy and also taught them how to work within the parameters of the system. The Verband Deutscher Soldaten (League of German Soldiers) represented a bloc of between two to three million voters, and could not be ignored by political parties on either side of the spectrum.

Nevertheless, the integration of former officers was not unconditional. Former officers believed that soldierly values—loyalty, character, patriotism—made them more effective citizens. They also saw themselves as a bulwark against communism. Still, Lockenour points out the diversity of veterans groups, even as they coalesced under the umbrella of the Verband Deutscher Soldaten. The League of the Former Members of the Africa Corps, for instance, fashioned themselves in the spirit of chivalry and international bonhomie that they believed characterized the war in the desert. Such nuances, however, did not override a shared identity or strong sense of comraderie, which Lockenour argues “became equated with democracy since it allegedly represented a unity across rank, class, and political boundaries.” (p.60)

What is remarkable about this integration, Lockenour concludes, is that former officers were not predisposed to democracy in the first place. A willingness to peacefully work within the system did not erase years of Nazi rhetoric. “Although most officers had not been Nazi party members,” Lockenour writes, “there can be no denying the overtly National Socialist tone of their statements and ideas. Especially with regard to the causes and course of the war, 20 July [the plot to assassinate in Hitler in 1944], communism, and the role of a united Europe, the old soldiers shared much with the National Socialists.” (p. 181) Over time, though, the influence of former officers faded, as Bundeswehr veterans formed their own associations.

In constructing his study, Lockenour effectively draws on veterans’ group records from the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, as well as records from the Evangelical Academies at Bad Boll and Loccum, and the archives of the Bundestag. It is a thorough, compelling study, but with a curious omission. Lockenour does not mention the Himmerod Memorandum, which was a list of demands drawn up by former Wehrmacht officers that conditioned their cooperation in establishing the Bundeswehr. While the veterans groups Lockenour studies may not have been present at the drafting of the memorandum, it is unlikely it did not escape notice or comment. A minor omission, for sure, but one that still raises an eyebrow. Nonetheless, Soldiers as Citizens illuminates a great deal about the mindset of former Wehrmacht officers and their efforts to come to terms with a new order.
[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Jay Lockenour]]

File:Thanks of the Fatherland Cover.jpg

2019-10-19T19:59:55Z

Ueberaffe:

The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War

2019-10-19T19:59:31Z

Ueberaffe: Created page with "{{Infobox book | name = The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War | author = James M. Diehl | publisher = University of..."

{{Infobox book
| name = The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War

| author = James M. Diehl
| publisher = University of North Carolina Press
| pub_date = 1993
| pages = 345
| isbn = 0807820776
| image = [[File:Thanks of the Fatherland Cover.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

In ''The Thanks of the Fatherland'', James M. Diehl examines the role of Second World War veterans in West German politics, and firmly concludes that Bonn was not Weimar. Unlike their Weimar-era counterparts, veterans of World War II “never exercised a decisive political influence.” (p. 1) Diehl’s statement here does not rise above question or debate, but it is clear that German World War II veterans were not ultimately hostile to the fragile Bundesrepublik Deutschland, but, instead, were active participants in the emerging political system.

So why, in regard to veterans, was Bonn not Weimar? Before answering that, Diehl briefly surveys the experience of veterans in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. World War I veterans were, by and large, disdainful of the Weimar government, despite social legislation that specifically catered to veterans’ needs. In the end, their discontent “institutionalized instability” and helped facilitate the rise of the Third Reich. (p. 30) Ironically, the Nazi state offered fewer benefits to veterans, though they exalted them in propaganda. A lost war, and the destruction it wrought, however, ultimately soured public opinion against German veterans of World War II. Still, Diehl finds that 1945 presented veterans with a radically different political and social landscape.

The first key difference was that veterans no longer held a monopoly on the experience of total war. German civilians, either through Allied bombs or Soviet expulsions and violence, also suffered terribly, and were quite willing to call attention to their plight. “In post-World War II Germany,” Diehl observes, “traditional war victims—disabled veterans and survivors—found that they were now only one species in a nation of war victims created by the manifold disasters of the war and the regime that had unleashed it.” (p. 227)

The presence of the Allied occupation furnished another significant difference between the postwar climates of World Wars One and Two. Returning soldiers faced real deprivation in the late forties and nineteen fifties—denial of pensions, trouble finding work, the anger of a disillusioned population—and these conditions bred no small amount of resentment. Much of veterans’ anger, however, was channeled toward the Allied occupiers instead of the nascent government in Bonn. “The misguided and unnecessarily harsh policy of the occupying powers,” Diehl argues, “did have a significantly positive effect: the immediate postwar discontent of the war-disabled and former career officers was focused on the occupying powers instead of on German officials.” (p. 3)

This situation created an opportunity for the Bonn government to be responsive to veterans and successfully pass legislation that addressed their needs. Though imperfect, measures such as the Federal War Victims’ Benefits Law and the 131 Law, which established pensions for some veterans, ameliorated veterans’ grievances and bolstered their faith in the new, democratic government. Diehl summarizes: “Whereas after the First World War former officers had perceived the Weimar Republic as a threat, after a half decade of uncertainty and deprivation following the Second World War, the Federal Republic appeared as a savior.” (p. 161)

Successful lobbying, however, ultimately placed the relevance of veterans’ organizations in peril. Once they had achieved their initial goals, these groups faced what Diehl calls “a potential existential crisis.” (p. 163) While these organizations posed themselves as bulwarks against communism and bearers of a soldierly virtue that could fortify West German society, their political goals basically dissipated. This stretch of soul searching led to a clumsy, dubious attempt to unify veterans’ groups, but this move failed to expand veterans’ political clout. For one, veterans’ groups were too politically diverse and hidebound to their own institutional structures to present a united front. “Although the divided loyalties of German veterans,” Diehl concludes, “precluded the rise of a powerful veterans’ movement, they ultimately facilitated the successful integration of veterans into postwar German society.” (p. 226)

Diehl draws on a wealth of archival sources to support his research, and he convincingly argues much of his thesis, save for a gnawing question: can Diehl really argue that former soldiers never exercised a decisive political influence? Veterans’ groups’ influence may not have lasted much past the 1950s, but their initial campaigns can only be seen as a success. Not only were veterans willing to work within the political system, but they also stimulated valuable legislation. In other words, veterans represented a substantial effort to integrate into, and support, the emerging democracy of the BRD.

This is not to say that Diehl does not make a very large point with this book. But he is more accurate, perhaps, when he argues that, unlike the Weimar era, a “powerful veterans’ mystique did not develop after 1945.” (p. 4) Veterans may have developed crucial political clout in the early years of the BRD, but the experience of total war nonetheless revealed that not only was the veteran experience no longer unique, but other victims of war were organizing as well.

[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:James M. Diehl]]

Modern European History

2019-10-19T19:46:49Z

Ueberaffe:

==Reading Lists==
* [[Old Regime and Revolutionary France, ca. 1650-1800 - Perl-Rosenthal]]

==Book Summaries==
* Jean-Denis Bredin. [[The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus]] (1986)
* M. Brady Brower. [[Unruly Spirits: The Science of Scientific Phenomena in Modern France]] (2010)
* James M. Diehl. [[The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War]] (1993)
* Isabel V. Hull. [[Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany]] (2005)
* Jay Lockenour. [[Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955]] (2001)
* John Merriman. [[The Dynamite Club|The Dynamite Club: How A Bombing in Fin-de-Siecle Paris Ignited the Age of Modern Terror]] (2009)
* Robert G. Moeller. [[War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany]] (2001)
* Frederic Morton. [[A Nervous Splendor: 1888-1889]] (1979)
* Carl E. Schorske. [[Fin-de-Siècle Vienna| Fin-de-Siècle Vienna - Politics and Culture]] (1981)
* Alaric Searl. [[Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959]] (2003)
* Debora Silverman. [[Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology and Style]] (1992)
* Eugen Weber. [[Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914]] (1976)

Modern European History

2019-10-19T19:44:40Z

Ueberaffe:

==Reading Lists==
* [[Old Regime and Revolutionary France, ca. 1650-1800 - Perl-Rosenthal]]

==Book Summaries==
* Jean-Denis Bredin. [[The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus]] (1986)
* M. Brady Brower. [[Unruly Spirits: The Science of Scientific Phenomena in Modern France]] (2010)
* Isabel V. Hull. [[Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany]] (2005)
* Jay Lockenour. [[Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955]] (2001)
* John Merriman. [[The Dynamite Club|The Dynamite Club: How A Bombing in Fin-de-Siecle Paris Ignited the Age of Modern Terror]] (2009)
* Robert G. Moeller. [[War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany]] (2001)
* Frederic Morton. [[A Nervous Splendor: 1888-1889]] (1979)
* Carl E. Schorske. [[Fin-de-Siècle Vienna| Fin-de-Siècle Vienna - Politics and Culture]] (1981)
* Alaric Searl. [[Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959]] (2003)
* Debora Silverman. [[Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology and Style]] (1992)
* Eugen Weber. [[Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914]] (1976)

Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955

2019-10-07T01:46:52Z

Ueberaffe:

File:Soldiers as Citizens.jpg

2019-10-07T01:41:41Z

Ueberaffe:

Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955

2019-10-07T01:41:20Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Soldiers as Citizens:Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955

| author = Jay Lockenour
| publisher = University of Nebraska Press
| pub_date = 2001
| pages = 255
| isbn = 0803229402
| image = [[File:Soldiers as Citizens.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

In Soldiers as Citizens, Jay Lockenour examines the ways in which former Wehrmacht officers searched for a place in West Germany and the emerging Cold War order. What is striking is that, unlike their Weimar-era counterparts, these veterans ultimately integrated themselves into the burgeoning democracy of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Even more remarkable, is the fact that this integration occurred despite a shared sense of alienation and longing for order. For Lockenour, this process strikes at the heart of the postwar stability of the BRD. “The process by which these officers came to espouse democracy and ‘Western’ values in the aftermath of World War II,” he argues, “is key to understanding the Federal Republic of Germany.” (p. 9)

Yet integration faced steep odds. To much of the West German public, former Wehrmacht officers were a reminder of a lost war and a discredited Third Reich. Moreover, these men were denied pensions because the occupying Allies feared that special treatment of former officers bred the sort of militarism that had started the war in the first place. These two issues, “defamation” of veterans and the loss of pensions, promoted a sense of unity among former officers, galvanizing them into political action.

Despite the fact that veteran groups were initially banned by the Allies, former officers organized with alacrity, circumventing the law when necessary. For instance, veterans’ leagues often recruited women and family members to give the appearance of a broader base. It was, ironically, this kind of political action that ultimately made former officers receptive to democracy. “By 1953,” writes Lockenour, “former officers and their organizations had learned the language of democracy and had gone to great lengths to cooperate with the Federal Republic’s own variation of Gleichschaltung (coordination).” (p. 62) Political organization taught veterans the language of democracy and also taught them how to work within the parameters of the system. The Verband Deutscher Soldaten (League of German Soldiers) represented a bloc of between two to three million voters, and could not be ignored by political parties on either side of the spectrum.

Nevertheless, the integration of former officers was not unconditional. Former officers believed that soldierly values—loyalty, character, patriotism—made them more effective citizens. They also saw themselves as a bulwark against communism. Still, Lockenour points out the diversity of veterans groups, even as they coalesced under the umbrella of the Verband Deutscher Soldaten. The League of the Former Members of the Africa Corps, for instance, fashioned themselves in the spirit of chivalry and international bonhomie that they believed characterized the war in the desert. Such nuances, however, did not override a shared identity or strong sense of comraderie, which Lockenour argues “became equated with democracy since it allegedly represented a unity across rank, class, and political boundaries.” (p.60)

What is remarkable about this integration, Lockenour concludes, is that former officers were not predisposed to democracy in the first place. A willingness to peacefully work within the system did not erase years of Nazi rhetoric. “Although most officers had not been Nazi party members,” Lockenour writes, “there can be no denying the overtly National Socialist tone of their statements and ideas. Especially with regard to the causes and course of the war, 20 July [the plot to assassinate in Hitler in 1944], communism, and the role of a united Europe, the old soldiers shared much with the National Socialists.” (p. 181) Over time, though, the influence of former officers faded, as Bundeswehr veterans formed their own associations.

In constructing his study, Lockenour effectively draws on veterans’ group records from the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, as well as records from the Evangelical Academies at Bad Boll and Loccum, and the archives of the Bundestag. It is a thorough, compelling study, but with a curious omission. Lockenour does not mention the Himmerod Memorandum, which was a list of demands drawn up by former Wehrmacht officers that conditioned their cooperation in establishing the Bundeswehr. While the veterans groups Lockenour studies may not have been present at the drafting of the memorandum, it is unlikely it did not escape notice or comment. A minor omission, for sure, but one that still raises an eyebrow. Nonethless, Soldiers as Citizens illuminates a great deal about the mindset of former Wehrmacht officers and their efforts to come to terms with a new order.
[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Alaric Searle]]

Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955

2019-10-07T01:38:49Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Soldiers as Citizens:Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955

| author = Jay Lockenour
| publisher = University of Nebraska Press
| pub_date = 2001
| pages = 255
| isbn = 0803229402
| image = [[File:Searle Cover.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

In Soldiers as Citizens, Jay Lockenour examines the ways in which former Wehrmacht officers searched for a place in West Germany and the emerging Cold War order. What is striking is that, unlike their Weimar-era counterparts, these veterans ultimately integrated themselves into the burgeoning democracy of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Even more remarkable, is the fact that this integration occurred despite a shared sense of alienation and longing for order. For Lockenour, this process strikes at the heart of the postwar stability of the BRD. “The process by which these officers came to espouse democracy and ‘Western’ values in the aftermath of World War II,” he argues, “is key to understanding the Federal Republic of Germany.” (p. 9)

Yet integration faced steep odds. To much of the West German public, former Wehrmacht officers were a reminder of a lost war and a discredited Third Reich. Moreover, these men were denied pensions because the occupying Allies feared that special treatment of former officers bred the sort of militarism that had started the war in the first place. These two issues, “defamation” of veterans and the loss of pensions, promoted a sense of unity among former officers, galvanizing them into political action.

Despite the fact that veteran groups were initially banned by the Allies, former officers organized with alacrity, circumventing the law when necessary. For instance, veterans’ leagues often recruited women and family members to give the appearance of a broader base. It was, ironically, this kind of political action that ultimately made former officers receptive to democracy. “By 1953,” writes Lockenour, “former officers and their organizations had learned the language of democracy and had gone to great lengths to cooperate with the Federal Republic’s own variation of Gleichschaltung (coordination).” (p. 62) Political organization taught veterans the language of democracy and also taught them how to work within the parameters of the system. The Verband Deutscher Soldaten (League of German Soldiers) represented a bloc of between two to three million voters, and could not be ignored by political parties on either side of the spectrum.

Nevertheless, the integration of former officers was not unconditional. Former officers believed that soldierly values—loyalty, character, patriotism—made them more effective citizens. They also saw themselves as a bulwark against communism. Still, Lockenour points out the diversity of veterans groups, even as they coalesced under the umbrella of the Verband Deutscher Soldaten. The League of the Former Members of the Africa Corps, for instance, fashioned themselves in the spirit of chivalry and international bonhomie that they believed characterized the war in the desert. Such nuances, however, did not override a shared identity or strong sense of comraderie, which Lockenour argues “became equated with democracy since it allegedly represented a unity across rank, class, and political boundaries.” (p.60)

What is remarkable about this integration, Lockenour concludes, is that former officers were not predisposed to democracy in the first place. A willingness to peacefully work within the system did not erase years of Nazi rhetoric. “Although most officers had not been Nazi party members,” Lockenour writes, “there can be no denying the overtly National Socialist tone of their statements and ideas. Especially with regard to the causes and course of the war, 20 July [the plot to assassinate in Hitler in 1944], communism, and the role of a united Europe, the old soldiers shared much with the National Socialists.” (p. 181) Over time, though, the influence of former officers faded, as Bundeswehr veterans formed their own associations.

In constructing his study, Lockenour effectively draws on veterans’ group records from the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, as well as records from the Evangelical Academies at Bad Boll and Loccum, and the archives of the Bundestag. It is a thorough, compelling study, but with a curious omission. Lockenour does not mention the Himmerod Memorandum, which was a list of demands drawn up by former Wehrmacht officers that conditioned their cooperation in establishing the Bundeswehr. While the veterans groups Lockenour studies may not have been present at the drafting of the memorandum, it is unlikely it did not escape notice or comment. A minor omission, for sure, but one that still raises an eyebrow. Nonethless, Soldiers as Citizens illuminates a great deal about the mindset of former Wehrmacht officers and their efforts to come to terms with a new order.
[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Alaric Searle]]

Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955

2019-10-07T01:37:49Z

Ueberaffe: Created page with "{{Infobox book | name = Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959 | author = Jay Lockenour | publisher = Univer..."

{{Infobox book
| name = Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959

| author = Jay Lockenour
| publisher = University of Nebraska Press
| pub_date = 2001
| pages = 255
| isbn = 0803229402
| image = [[File:Searle Cover.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

In Soldiers as Citizens, Jay Lockenour examines the ways in which former Wehrmacht officers searched for a place in West Germany and the emerging Cold War order. What is striking is that, unlike their Weimar-era counterparts, these veterans ultimately integrated themselves into the burgeoning democracy of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Even more remarkable, is the fact that this integration occurred despite a shared sense of alienation and longing for order. For Lockenour, this process strikes at the heart of the postwar stability of the BRD. “The process by which these officers came to espouse democracy and ‘Western’ values in the aftermath of World War II,” he argues, “is key to understanding the Federal Republic of Germany.” (p. 9)

Yet integration faced steep odds. To much of the West German public, former Wehrmacht officers were a reminder of a lost war and a discredited Third Reich. Moreover, these men were denied pensions because the occupying Allies feared that special treatment of former officers bred the sort of militarism that had started the war in the first place. These two issues, “defamation” of veterans and the loss of pensions, promoted a sense of unity among former officers, galvanizing them into political action.

Despite the fact that veteran groups were initially banned by the Allies, former officers organized with alacrity, circumventing the law when necessary. For instance, veterans’ leagues often recruited women and family members to give the appearance of a broader base. It was, ironically, this kind of political action that ultimately made former officers receptive to democracy. “By 1953,” writes Lockenour, “former officers and their organizations had learned the language of democracy and had gone to great lengths to cooperate with the Federal Republic’s own variation of Gleichschaltung (coordination).” (p. 62) Political organization taught veterans the language of democracy and also taught them how to work within the parameters of the system. The Verband Deutscher Soldaten (League of German Soldiers) represented a bloc of between two to three million voters, and could not be ignored by political parties on either side of the spectrum.

Nevertheless, the integration of former officers was not unconditional. Former officers believed that soldierly values—loyalty, character, patriotism—made them more effective citizens. They also saw themselves as a bulwark against communism. Still, Lockenour points out the diversity of veterans groups, even as they coalesced under the umbrella of the Verband Deutscher Soldaten. The League of the Former Members of the Africa Corps, for instance, fashioned themselves in the spirit of chivalry and international bonhomie that they believed characterized the war in the desert. Such nuances, however, did not override a shared identity or strong sense of comraderie, which Lockenour argues “became equated with democracy since it allegedly represented a unity across rank, class, and political boundaries.” (p.60)

What is remarkable about this integration, Lockenour concludes, is that former officers were not predisposed to democracy in the first place. A willingness to peacefully work within the system did not erase years of Nazi rhetoric. “Although most officers had not been Nazi party members,” Lockenour writes, “there can be no denying the overtly National Socialist tone of their statements and ideas. Especially with regard to the causes and course of the war, 20 July [the plot to assassinate in Hitler in 1944], communism, and the role of a united Europe, the old soldiers shared much with the National Socialists.” (p. 181) Over time, though, the influence of former officers faded, as Bundeswehr veterans formed their own associations.

In constructing his study, Lockenour effectively draws on veterans’ group records from the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, as well as records from the Evangelical Academies at Bad Boll and Loccum, and the archives of the Bundestag. It is a thorough, compelling study, but with a curious omission. Lockenour does not mention the Himmerod Memorandum, which was a list of demands drawn up by former Wehrmacht officers that conditioned their cooperation in establishing the Bundeswehr. While the veterans groups Lockenour studies may not have been present at the drafting of the memorandum, it is unlikely it did not escape notice or comment. A minor omission, for sure, but one that still raises an eyebrow. Nonethless, Soldiers as Citizens illuminates a great deal about the mindset of former Wehrmacht officers and their efforts to come to terms with a new order.
[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Alaric Searle]]

Modern European History

2019-10-07T01:34:27Z

Ueberaffe:

==Reading Lists==
* [[Old Regime and Revolutionary France, ca. 1650-1800 - Perl-Rosenthal]]

==Book Summaries==
* Jean-Denis Bredin. [[The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus]] (1986)
* M. Brady Brower. [[Unruly Spirits: The Science of Scientific Phenomena in Modern France]] (2010)
* Isabel V. Hull. [[Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany]] (2005)
* John Merriman. [[The Dynamite Club|The Dynamite Club: How A Bombing in Fin-de-Siecle Paris Ignited the Age of Modern Terror]] (2009)
* Frederic Morton. [[A Nervous Splendor: 1888-1889]] (1979)
* Carl E. Schorske. [[Fin-de-Siècle Vienna| Fin-de-Siècle Vienna - Politics and Culture]] (1981)
* Debora Silverman. [[Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology and Style]] (1992)
* Eugen Weber. [[Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914]] (1976)
* Robert G. Moeller. [[War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany]] (2001)
* Alaric Searl. [[Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959]] (2003)
* Jay Lockenour. [[Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955]] (2001)

Modern European History

2019-10-07T01:33:35Z

Ueberaffe:

==Reading Lists==
* [[Old Regime and Revolutionary France, ca. 1650-1800 - Perl-Rosenthal]]

==Book Summaries==
* Jean-Denis Bredin. [[The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus]] (1986)
* M. Brady Brower. [[Unruly Spirits: The Science of Scientific Phenomena in Modern France]] (2010)
* Isabel V. Hull. [[Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany]] (2005)
* John Merriman. [[The Dynamite Club|The Dynamite Club: How A Bombing in Fin-de-Siecle Paris Ignited the Age of Modern Terror]] (2009)
* Frederic Morton. [[A Nervous Splendor: 1888-1889]] (1979)
* Carl E. Schorske. [[Fin-de-Siècle Vienna| Fin-de-Siècle Vienna - Politics and Culture]] (1981)
* Debora Silverman. [[Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology and Style]] (1992)
* Eugen Weber. [[Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914]] (1976)
* Robert G. Moeller. [[War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany]] (2001)
* Alaric Searl. [[Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959]] (2003)
* Jay Lockenour. [Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955] (2001)

War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany

2019-09-24T00:01:15Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany

| author = Robert G. Moeller
| publisher = University of California Press
| pub_date = 2001
| pages = 329
| isbn = 0520223268
| image = [[File:War Stories Cover.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

In ''War Stories'', Robert G. Moeller challenges the long-held notion that West Germans simply forgot the Nazi past after the end of World War II. To the contrary, he argues that “West Germans remembered key parts of the first half of the 1940s with extraordinary passion and emotion.” Yet he warns that “remembering selectively was not the same as forgetting.” (p. 16) What West Germans remembered, however, cast themselves—as opposed to those persecuted by the Nazis—as victims of the war. These acts of selective memory, which mainly focused on the plight of POWs in the USSR and those expelled from the east, became “one of the most powerful integrative myths” in the formation of West German national identity in the 1950s. (p. 6)

Chapter One frames Moeller’s premise, serving mostly as an introduction. The second chapter discusses debates over compensation for victims of the Nazis, beginning with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s controversial push for reparations to Israel. Against this backdrop, Moeller describes how West Germans developed new regimes of memory that equated the suffering of Germans with the victims of Nazi atrocities. Indeed, issues of compensation for expellees and POWs took center stage in the 1950s. If those who suffered, and especially suffering Germans, had a face, the perpetrators did not. Moeller observes that “public discussions of the expellees and Soviet-held POWs outlined an agenda for social, economic, psychological, and political reconstruction in the early Federal Republic; they also indicated which moral ledgers of the war’s costs West Germans would leave open and which they would shut and set aside.” (p. 50)

Chapter Three examines the way that West Germans’ selective memories intertwined with historical inquiry. The chapter centers on the multi-volume collection of eyewitness accounts of eastern expellees, titled ''Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neisse'' (The expulsion of the German population from the regions east of the Oder-Neisse). This massive work, sponsored by the West German government, sought to “combine coolly objective scholarly analysis with the emotional power of individual victims’ voices.” (p. 55) Led by Theodor Schieder, the project coordinated with local groups of expellees, and told a very lop-sided account of the expulsions. Most tellingly, Moeller observes that “Jews were not invited to speak for themselves” in these accounts, which mostly portrayed Germans as victims of barbarous revenge at the hands of Russians, Poles, and even Jewish partisans. (p. 74)

The fourth chapter examines Adenauer’s trip to Moscow in 1955 and the return of the remaining POWs from the Soviet Union, an event Moeller describes as “the symbolic end of the war.” (p. 89) The return of POWs was marked by much fanfare, and created a sense of national unity despite the fact that Adenauer’s trip to the Soviet capitol made a divided Germany a cold reality. Still, Adenauer’s trip raised his prestige in the Federal Republic. During the trip, Moeller argues, “Adenauer appears not only as a geopolitical strategist but also as a compassionate, if forceful, father, insisting on the release of his nation’s sons.” (p. 91).

In Chapter Five, Moeller analyses seven films that depict the experience of expellees and POWs. These films reinforced West Germans selective memory, and “dramatized parts of the past that West Germans wanted to see.” (p. 127) In the Epilogue, Moeller argues that the legacies of German victimhood became “incorporated into the founding myths of the Federal Republic.” (p. 172)
[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Robert G. Moeller]]

Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959

2019-09-23T23:57:28Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959

| author = Alaric Searle
| publisher = Praeger Publishers
| pub_date = 2003
| pages = 316
| isbn = 0275979687
| image = [[File:Searle Cover.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

Alaric Searle’s monograph deals with the efforts of former Wehrmacht generals to influence the rearmament debate in West Germany in the 1950s. The study challenges the notion that Wehrmacht generals disappeared from the public eye or remained ‘apolitical’ in the aftermath of defeat. To the contrary, many generals took on active roles in the debate on rearmament, in official and unofficial capacities. Still, Searle concludes that officers who participated in the debate were by and large a “''politicized minority''” (author’s emphasis, p. 277), and that “the restructuring of German society in the West and the democratization of the armed forces was never greatly endangered by former generals.” (p. 282) Instead, the most powerful faction of generals to emerge during the debate was that of what Searle calls “pro-rearmament realists” who accepted military reform and integration into the West.

Searle organizes the work thematically, with the first chapters focusing specifically on generals’ attempts to effect the re-armament debate within official institutions. Here Searle finds deep rifts regarding the legacies of the Third Reich, culminating in machinations by, among others, Hans Speidel and Reinhard Gehlen to oust the anti-Nazi general, Gerhard von Schwerin, from his position as Konrad Adenauer’s national security advisor. Schwerin’s support for the conspirators of July 20, 1944 offended a number of former generals who saw the assassination attempt on Hitler as a violation of soldiers’ oath of service. Despite some intense infighting, Searle still concludes that “Wehrmacht generals were willing to go quite far in agreeing to the necessity of reforms” and even sought to block more radical, right-wing generals (such as Heinz Guderian) from gaining influence. (p. 128)

The following chapters examines the public’s perception of Wehrmacht generals and veterans’ groups efforts to influence the re-armament debate. Searle finds that public perceptions of Wehrmacht generals were, by and large, negative. Generals, to many Germans, were not only reminders of a lost war but also viewed as relics of the Nazi past. After the onset of the Korean war, these views softened as some Germans’ came to value generals’ technical expertise, but overwhelmingly negative views remained.

Negative views toward former Wehrmacht generals were especially manifest during three high-profile trials. The trial of Otto Remer demonstrated that “well after the founding of the Bundeswehr very little in the way of support for the memory of July 20 could be found in official quarters.” (p. 246) The trials of Ferdinand Schörner and Hasso von Manteuffel—who were separately charged for executing German soldiers during the war—showed how “generals became, in many minds, a metaphor for the barbarities of the Third Reich.” (p. 266)

In his conclusion, Searle makes a challengeable assertion that a myth of the “clean Wehrmacht” did not take hold among the West German public in the years following the end of the war. “The fact that Wehrmacht generals took on a symbolic quality for the new political culture of the Federal Republic as an embodiment for the failures of the past . . .” Searle argues, “invalidates the claim that there was an all-pervasive myth of a clean Wehrmacht in the 1950s.” (p, 286) As evidence, Searle points to the overwhelming popular condemnation of Schörner and Manteuffel during their respective trials. It is worth noting, though, that these trials dealt largely with actions taken against Wehrmacht rank and file, and not atrocities against non-Germans. In other words, a distinction can still be made between “dirty” Generals who execute Germans and relatively “clean” Wehrmacht soldiers who simply did their duty.

That aside, Searle’s study sheds a great deal of light on a crucial West-German demographic and their efforts to influence the debate on rearmament. The monograph draws on archival sources from Germany, England, and the United States, as well as a rich variety of secondary sources. If his claims about the myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht do not escape question, his study is still a valuable counterpoint to the images of generals spun by memoirs and postwar biographies.

[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Alaric Searle]]

Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959

2019-09-23T23:56:23Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959

| author = Alaric Searle
| publisher = Praeger Publishers
| pub_date = 2003
| pages = 316
| isbn = 0275979687
| image = [[File:Searle Cover.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

Alaric Searle’s monograph deals with the efforts of former Wehrmacht generals to influence the rearmament debate in West Germany in the 1950s. The study challenges the notion that Wehrmacht generals disappeared from the public eye or remained ‘apolitical’ in the aftermath of defeat. To the contrary, many generals took on active roles in the debate on rearmament, in official and unofficial capacities. Still, Searle concludes that officers who participated in the debate were by and large a “politicized minority” (author’s emphasis, p. 277), and that “the restructuring of German society in the West and the democratization of the armed forces was never greatly endangered by former generals.” (p. 282) Instead, the most powerful faction of generals to emerge during the debate was that of what Searle calls “pro-rearmament realists” who accepted military reform and integration into the West.

Searle organizes the work thematically, with the first chapters focusing specifically on generals’ attempts to effect the re-armament debate within official institutions. Here Searle finds deep rifts regarding the legacies of the Third Reich, culminating in machinations by, among others, Hans Speidel and Reinhard Gehlen to oust the anti-Nazi general, Gerhard von Schwerin, from his position as Konrad Adenauer’s national security advisor. Schwerin’s support for the conspirators of July 20, 1944 offended a number of former generals who saw the assassination attempt on Hitler as a violation of soldiers’ oath of service. Despite some intense infighting, Searle still concludes that “Wehrmacht generals were willing to go quite far in agreeing to the necessity of reforms” and even sought to block more radical, right-wing generals (such as Heinz Guderian) from gaining influence. (p. 128)

The following chapters examines the public’s perception of Wehrmacht generals and veterans’ groups efforts to influence the re-armament debate. Searle finds that public perceptions of Wehrmacht generals were, by and large, negative. Generals, to many Germans, were not only reminders of a lost war but also viewed as relics of the Nazi past. After the onset of the Korean war, these views softened as some Germans’ came to value generals’ technical expertise, but overwhelmingly negative views remained.

Negative views toward former Wehrmacht generals were especially manifest during three high-profile trials. The trial of Otto Remer demonstrated that “well after the founding of the Bundeswehr very little in the way of support for the memory of July 20 could be found in official quarters.” (p. 246) The trials of Ferdinand Schörner and Hasso von Manteuffel—who were separately charged for executing German soldiers during the war—showed how “generals became, in many minds, a metaphor for the barbarities of the Third Reich.” (p. 266)

In his conclusion, Searle makes a challengeable assertion that a myth of the “clean Wehrmacht” did not take hold among the West German public in the years following the end of the war. “The fact that Wehrmacht generals took on a symbolic quality for the new political culture of the Federal Republic as an embodiment for the failures of the past . . .” Searle argues, “invalidates the claim that there was an all-pervasive myth of a clean Wehrmacht in the 1950s.” (p, 286) As evidence, Searle points to the overwhelming popular condemnation of Schörner and Manteuffel during their respective trials. It is worth noting, though, that these trials dealt largely with actions taken against Wehrmacht rank and file, and not atrocities against non-Germans. In other words, a distinction can still be made between “dirty” Generals who execute Germans and relatively “clean” Wehrmacht soldiers who simply did their duty.

That aside, Searle’s study sheds a great deal of light on a crucial West-German demographic and their efforts to influence the debate on rearmament. The monograph draws on archival sources from Germany, England, and the United States, as well as a rich variety of secondary sources. If his claims about the myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht do not escape question, his study is still a valuable counterpoint to the images of generals spun by memoirs and postwar biographies.

[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Alaric Searle]]

File:Searle Cover.jpg

2019-09-23T23:54:52Z

Ueberaffe:

Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959

2019-09-23T23:54:29Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959

| author = Alaric Searle
| publisher = Praeger Publishers
| pub_date = 2003
| pages = 316
| isbn = 0275979687
| image = [[File:Searle Cover.jpg|alt=image]]
}}

Alaric Searle’s monograph deals with the efforts of former Wehrmacht generals to influence the rearmament debate in West Germany in the 1950s. The study challenges the notion that Wehrmacht generals disappeared from the public eye or remained ‘apolitical’ in the aftermath of defeat. To the contrary, many generals took on active roles in the debate on rearmament, in official and unofficial capacities. Still, Searle concludes that officers who participated in the debate were by and large a “politicized minority” (author’s emphasis, p. 277), and that “the restructuring of German society in the West and the democratization of the armed forces was never greatly endangered by former generals.” (p. 282) Instead, the most powerful faction of generals to emerge during the debate was that of what Searle calls “pro-rearmament realists” who accepted military reform and integration into the West.

Searle organizes the work thematically, with the first chapters focusing specifically on generals’ attempts to effect the re-armament debate within official institutions. Here Searle finds deep rifts regarding the legacies of the Third Reich, culminating in machinations by, among others, Hans Speidel and Reinhard Gehlen to oust the anti-Nazi general, Gerhard von Schwerin, from his position as Konrad Adenauer’s national security advisor. Schwerin’s support for the conspirators of July 20, 1944 offended a number of former generals who saw the assassination attempt on Hitler as a violation of soldiers’ oath of service. Despite some intense infighting, Searle still concludes that “Wehrmacht generals were willing to go quite far in agreeing to the necessity of reforms” and even sought to block more radical, right-wing generals (such as Heinz Guderian) from gaining influence. (p. 128)

The following chapters examines the public’s perception of Wehrmacht generals and veterans’ groups efforts to influence the re-armament debate. Searle finds that public perceptions of Wehrmacht generals were, by and large, negative. Generals, to many Germans, were not only reminders of a lost war but also viewed as relics of the Nazi past. After the onset of the Korean war, these views softened as some Germans’ came to value generals’ technical expertise, but overwhelmingly negative views remained.

Negative views toward former Wehrmacht generals were especially manifest during three high-profile trials. The trial of Otto Remer demonstrated that “well after the founding of the Bundeswehr very little in the way of support for the memory of July 20 could be found in official quarters.” (p. 246) The trials of Ferdinand Schörner and Hasso von Manteuffel—who were separately charged for executing German soldiers during the war—showed how “generals became, in many minds, a metaphor for the barbarities of the Third Reich.” (p. 266)

In his conclusion, Searle makes a challengeable assertion that a myth of the “clean Wehrmacht” did not take hold among the West German public in the years following the end of the war. “The fact that Wehrmacht generals took on a symbolic quality for the new political culture of the Federal Republic as an embodiment for the failures of the past . . .” Searle argues, “invalidates the claim that there was an all-pervasive myth of a clean Wehrmacht in the 1950s.” (p, 286) As evidence, Searle points to the overwhelming popular condemnation of Schörner and Manteuffel during their respective trials. It is worth noting, though, that these trials dealt largely with actions taken against Wehrmacht rank and file, and not atrocities against non-Germans. In other words, a distinction can still be made between “dirty” Generals who execute Germans and relatively “clean” Wehrmacht soldiers who simply did their duty.

That aside, Searle’s study sheds a great deal of light on a crucial West-German demographic and their efforts to influence the debate on rearmament. The monograph draws on archival sources from Germany, England, and the United States, as well as a rich variety of secondary sources. If his claims about the myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht do not escape question, his study is still a valuable counterpoint to the images of generals spun by memoirs and postwar biographies.

[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Alaric Searle]]

Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959

2019-09-23T23:53:08Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959

| author = Alaric Searle
| publisher = Praeger Publishers
| pub_date = 2003
| pages = 316
| isbn = 0275979687
| image = [[File:Name of File.jpg|alt=image]]
}}

Alaric Searle’s monograph deals with the efforts of former Wehrmacht generals to influence the rearmament debate in West Germany in the 1950s. The study challenges the notion that Wehrmacht generals disappeared from the public eye or remained ‘apolitical’ in the aftermath of defeat. To the contrary, many generals took on active roles in the debate on rearmament, in official and unofficial capacities. Still, Searle concludes that officers who participated in the debate were by and large a “politicized minority” (author’s emphasis, p. 277), and that “the restructuring of German society in the West and the democratization of the armed forces was never greatly endangered by former generals.” (p. 282) Instead, the most powerful faction of generals to emerge during the debate was that of what Searle calls “pro-rearmament realists” who accepted military reform and integration into the West.

Searle organizes the work thematically, with the first chapters focusing specifically on generals’ attempts to effect the re-armament debate within official institutions. Here Searle finds deep rifts regarding the legacies of the Third Reich, culminating in machinations by, among others, Hans Speidel and Reinhard Gehlen to oust the anti-Nazi general, Gerhard von Schwerin, from his position as Konrad Adenauer’s national security advisor. Schwerin’s support for the conspirators of July 20, 1944 offended a number of former generals who saw the assassination attempt on Hitler as a violation of soldiers’ oath of service. Despite some intense infighting, Searle still concludes that “Wehrmacht generals were willing to go quite far in agreeing to the necessity of reforms” and even sought to block more radical, right-wing generals (such as Heinz Guderian) from gaining influence. (p. 128)

The following chapters examines the public’s perception of Wehrmacht generals and veterans’ groups efforts to influence the re-armament debate. Searle finds that public perceptions of Wehrmacht generals were, by and large, negative. Generals, to many Germans, were not only reminders of a lost war but also viewed as relics of the Nazi past. After the onset of the Korean war, these views softened as some Germans’ came to value generals’ technical expertise, but overwhelmingly negative views remained.

Negative views toward former Wehrmacht generals were especially manifest during three high-profile trials. The trial of Otto Remer demonstrated that “well after the founding of the Bundeswehr very little in the way of support for the memory of July 20 could be found in official quarters.” (p. 246) The trials of Ferdinand Schörner and Hasso von Manteuffel—who were separately charged for executing German soldiers during the war—showed how “generals became, in many minds, a metaphor for the barbarities of the Third Reich.” (p. 266)

In his conclusion, Searle makes a challengeable assertion that a myth of the “clean Wehrmacht” did not take hold among the West German public in the years following the end of the war. “The fact that Wehrmacht generals took on a symbolic quality for the new political culture of the Federal Republic as an embodiment for the failures of the past . . .” Searle argues, “invalidates the claim that there was an all-pervasive myth of a clean Wehrmacht in the 1950s.” (p, 286) As evidence, Searle points to the overwhelming popular condemnation of Schörner and Manteuffel during their respective trials. It is worth noting, though, that these trials dealt largely with actions taken against Wehrmacht rank and file, and not atrocities against non-Germans. In other words, a distinction can still be made between “dirty” Generals who execute Germans and relatively “clean” Wehrmacht soldiers who simply did their duty.

That aside, Searle’s study sheds a great deal of light on a crucial West-German demographic and their efforts to influence the debate on rearmament. The monograph draws on archival sources from Germany, England, and the United States, as well as a rich variety of secondary sources. If his claims about the myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht do not escape question, his study is still a valuable counterpoint to the images of generals spun by memoirs and postwar biographies.

[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Isabel V. Hull]]

Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959

2019-09-23T23:52:08Z

Ueberaffe: Created page with "{{Infobox book | name = Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959 | author = Alaric Searle | publisher = Praege..."

{{Infobox book
| name = Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959

| author = Alaric Searle
| publisher = Praeger Publishers
| pub_date = 2003
| pages = 316
| isbn = 0275979687
| image = [[|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

Alaric Searle’s monograph deals with the efforts of former Wehrmacht generals to influence the rearmament debate in West Germany in the 1950s. The study challenges the notion that Wehrmacht generals disappeared from the public eye or remained ‘apolitical’ in the aftermath of defeat. To the contrary, many generals took on active roles in the debate on rearmament, in official and unofficial capacities. Still, Searle concludes that officers who participated in the debate were by and large a “politicized minority” (author’s emphasis, p. 277), and that “the restructuring of German society in the West and the democratization of the armed forces was never greatly endangered by former generals.” (p. 282) Instead, the most powerful faction of generals to emerge during the debate was that of what Searle calls “pro-rearmament realists” who accepted military reform and integration into the West.

Searle organizes the work thematically, with the first chapters focusing specifically on generals’ attempts to effect the re-armament debate within official institutions. Here Searle finds deep rifts regarding the legacies of the Third Reich, culminating in machinations by, among others, Hans Speidel and Reinhard Gehlen to oust the anti-Nazi general, Gerhard von Schwerin, from his position as Konrad Adenauer’s national security advisor. Schwerin’s support for the conspirators of July 20, 1944 offended a number of former generals who saw the assassination attempt on Hitler as a violation of soldiers’ oath of service. Despite some intense infighting, Searle still concludes that “Wehrmacht generals were willing to go quite far in agreeing to the necessity of reforms” and even sought to block more radical, right-wing generals (such as Heinz Guderian) from gaining influence. (p. 128)

The following chapters examines the public’s perception of Wehrmacht generals and veterans’ groups efforts to influence the re-armament debate. Searle finds that public perceptions of Wehrmacht generals were, by and large, negative. Generals, to many Germans, were not only reminders of a lost war but also viewed as relics of the Nazi past. After the onset of the Korean war, these views softened as some Germans’ came to value generals’ technical expertise, but overwhelmingly negative views remained.

Negative views toward former Wehrmacht generals were especially manifest during three high-profile trials. The trial of Otto Remer demonstrated that “well after the founding of the Bundeswehr very little in the way of support for the memory of July 20 could be found in official quarters.” (p. 246) The trials of Ferdinand Schörner and Hasso von Manteuffel—who were separately charged for executing German soldiers during the war—showed how “generals became, in many minds, a metaphor for the barbarities of the Third Reich.” (p. 266)

In his conclusion, Searle makes a challengeable assertion that a myth of the “clean Wehrmacht” did not take hold among the West German public in the years following the end of the war. “The fact that Wehrmacht generals took on a symbolic quality for the new political culture of the Federal Republic as an embodiment for the failures of the past . . .” Searle argues, “invalidates the claim that there was an all-pervasive myth of a clean Wehrmacht in the 1950s.” (p, 286) As evidence, Searle points to the overwhelming popular condemnation of Schörner and Manteuffel during their respective trials. It is worth noting, though, that these trials dealt largely with actions taken against Wehrmacht rank and file, and not atrocities against non-Germans. In other words, a distinction can still be made between “dirty” Generals who execute Germans and relatively “clean” Wehrmacht soldiers who simply did their duty.

That aside, Searle’s study sheds a great deal of light on a crucial West-German demographic and their efforts to influence the debate on rearmament. The monograph draws on archival sources from Germany, England, and the United States, as well as a rich variety of secondary sources. If his claims about the myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht do not escape question, his study is still a valuable counterpoint to the images of generals spun by memoirs and postwar biographies.

[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Isabel V. Hull]]

Modern European History

2019-09-23T23:48:01Z

Ueberaffe:

==Reading Lists==
* [[Old Regime and Revolutionary France, ca. 1650-1800 - Perl-Rosenthal]]

==Book Summaries==
* Jean-Denis Bredin. [[The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus]] (1986)
* M. Brady Brower. [[Unruly Spirits: The Science of Scientific Phenomena in Modern France]] (2010)
* Isabel V. Hull. [[Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany]] (2005)
* John Merriman. [[The Dynamite Club|The Dynamite Club: How A Bombing in Fin-de-Siecle Paris Ignited the Age of Modern Terror]] (2009)
* Frederic Morton. [[A Nervous Splendor: 1888-1889]] (1979)
* Carl E. Schorske. [[Fin-de-Siècle Vienna| Fin-de-Siècle Vienna - Politics and Culture]] (1981)
* Debora Silverman. [[Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology and Style]] (1992)
* Eugen Weber. [[Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914]] (1976)
* Robert G. Moeller. [[War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany]] (2001)
* Alaric Searl. [[Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959]] (2003)

Modern European History

2019-09-23T23:46:33Z

Ueberaffe:

==Reading Lists==
* [[Old Regime and Revolutionary France, ca. 1650-1800 - Perl-Rosenthal]]

==Book Summaries==
* Jean-Denis Bredin. [[The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus]] (1986)
* M. Brady Brower. [[Unruly Spirits: The Science of Scientific Phenomena in Modern France]] (2010)
* Isabel V. Hull. [[Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany]] (2005)
* John Merriman. [[The Dynamite Club|The Dynamite Club: How A Bombing in Fin-de-Siecle Paris Ignited the Age of Modern Terror]] (2009)
* Frederic Morton. [[A Nervous Splendor: 1888-1889]] (1979)
* Carl E. Schorske. [[Fin-de-Siècle Vienna| Fin-de-Siècle Vienna - Politics and Culture]] (1981)
* Debora Silverman. [[Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology and Style]] (1992)
* Eugen Weber. [[Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914]] (1976)
* Robert G. Moeller. [[War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany]] (2001)
* Alaric Searle. [Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959] (2003)

War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany

2019-09-22T12:49:25Z

Ueberaffe:

War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany

2019-09-22T12:46:22Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany

| author = Robert G. Moeller
| publisher = University of California Press
| pub_date = 2001
| pages = 329
| isbn = 0520223268
| image = [[File:War Stories Cover.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

In War Stories, Robert G. Moeller challenges the long-held notion that West Germans simply forgot the Nazi past after the end of World War II. To the contrary, he argues that “West Germans remembered key parts of the first half of the 1940s with extraordinary passion and emotion.” Yet he warns that “remembering selectively was not the same as forgetting.” (p. 16) What West Germans remembered, however, cast themselves—as opposed to those persecuted by the Nazis—as victims of the war. These acts of selective memory, which mainly focused on the plight of POWs in the USSR and those expelled from the east, became “one of the most powerful integrative myths” in the formation of West German national identity in the 1950s. (p. 6)

Chapter One frames Moeller’s premise, serving mostly as an introduction. The second chapter discusses debates over compensation for victims of the Nazis, beginning with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s controversial push for reparations to Israel. Against this backdrop, Moeller describes how West Germans developed new regimes of memory that equated the suffering of Germans with the victims of Nazi atrocities. Indeed, issues of compensation for expellees and POWs took center stage in the 1950s. If those who suffered, and especially suffering Germans, had a face, the perpetrators did not. Moeller observes that “public discussions of the expellees and Soviet-held POWs outlined an agenda for social, economic, psychological, and political reconstruction in the early Federal Republic; they also indicated which moral ledgers of the war’s costs West Germans would leave open and which they would shut and set aside.” (p. 50)

Chapter Three examines the way that West Germans’ selective memories intertwined with historical inquiry. The chapter centers on the multi-volume collection of eyewitness accounts of eastern expellees, titled Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neisse (The expulsion of the German population from the regions east of the Oder-Neisse). This massive work, sponsored by the West German government, sought to “combine coolly objective scholarly analysis with the emotional power of individual victims’ voices.” (p. 55) Led by Theodor Schieder, the project coordinated with local groups of expellees, and told a very lop-sided account of the expulsions. Most tellingly, Moeller observes that “Jews were not invited to speak for themselves” in these accounts, which mostly portrayed Germans as victims of barbarous revenge at the hands of Russians, Poles, and even Jewish partisans. (p. 74)

The fourth chapter examines Adenauer’s trip to Moscow in 1955 and the return of the remaining POWs from the Soviet Union, an event Moeller describes as “the symbolic end of the war.” (p. 89) The return of POWs was marked by much fanfare, and created a sense of national unity despite the fact that Adenauer’s trip to the Soviet capitol made a divided Germany a cold reality. Still, Adenauer’s trip raised his prestige in the Federal Republic. During the trip, Moeller argues, “Adenauer appears not only as a geopolitical strategist but also as a compassionate, if forceful, father, insisting on the release of his nation’s sons.” (p. 91).

In Chapter Five, Moeller analyses seven films that depict the experience of expellees and POWs. These films reinforced West Germans selective memory, and “dramatized parts of the past that West Germans wanted to see.” (p. 127) In the Epilogue, Moeller argues that the legacies of German victimhood became “incorporated into the founding myths of the Federal Republic.” (p. 172)
[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Isabel V. Hull]]

File:War Stories Cover.jpg

2019-09-22T12:45:03Z

Ueberaffe:

War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany

2019-09-22T12:43:53Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany

| author = Robert G. Moeller
| publisher = University of California Press
| pub_date = 2001
| pages = 329
| isbn = 0520223268
| image = [[File:War Stories Cover.jpg|alt=image]]
}}

In War Stories, Robert G. Moeller challenges the long-held notion that West Germans simply forgot the Nazi past after the end of World War II. To the contrary, he argues that “West Germans remembered key parts of the first half of the 1940s with extraordinary passion and emotion.” Yet he warns that “remembering selectively was not the same as forgetting.” (p. 16) What West Germans remembered, however, cast themselves—as opposed to those persecuted by the Nazis—as victims of the war. These acts of selective memory, which mainly focused on the plight of POWs in the USSR and those expelled from the east, became “one of the most powerful integrative myths” in the formation of West German national identity in the 1950s. (p. 6)

Chapter One frames Moeller’s premise, serving mostly as an introduction. The second chapter discusses debates over compensation for victims of the Nazis, beginning with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s controversial push for reparations to Israel. Against this backdrop, Moeller describes how West Germans developed new regimes of memory that equated the suffering of Germans with the victims of Nazi atrocities. Indeed, issues of compensation for expellees and POWs took center stage in the 1950s. If those who suffered, and especially suffering Germans, had a face, the perpetrators did not. Moeller observes that “public discussions of the expellees and Soviet-held POWs outlined an agenda for social, economic, psychological, and political reconstruction in the early Federal Republic; they also indicated which moral ledgers of the war’s costs West Germans would leave open and which they would shut and set aside.” (p. 50)

Chapter Three examines the way that West Germans’ selective memories intertwined with historical inquiry. The chapter centers on the multi-volume collection of eyewitness accounts of eastern expellees, titled Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neisse (The expulsion of the German population from the regions east of the Oder-Neisse). This massive work, sponsored by the West German government, sought to “combine coolly objective scholarly analysis with the emotional power of individual victims’ voices.” (p. 55) Led by Theodor Schieder, the project coordinated with local groups of expellees, and told a very lop-sided account of the expulsions. Most tellingly, Moeller observes that “Jews were not invited to speak for themselves” in these accounts, which mostly portrayed Germans as victims of barbarous revenge at the hands of Russians, Poles, and even Jewish partisans. (p. 74)

The fourth chapter examines Adenauer’s trip to Moscow in 1955 and the return of the remaining POWs from the Soviet Union, an event Moeller describes as “the symbolic end of the war.” (p. 89) The return of POWs was marked by much fanfare, and created a sense of national unity despite the fact that Adenauer’s trip to the Soviet capitol made a divided Germany a cold reality. Still, Adenauer’s trip raised his prestige in the Federal Republic. During the trip, Moeller argues, “Adenauer appears not only as a geopolitical strategist but also as a compassionate, if forceful, father, insisting on the release of his nation’s sons.” (p. 91).

In Chapter Five, Moeller analyses seven films that depict the experience of expellees and POWs. These films reinforced West Germans selective memory, and “dramatized parts of the past that West Germans wanted to see.” (p. 127) In the Epilogue, Moeller argues that the legacies of German victimhood became “incorporated into the founding myths of the Federal Republic.” (p. 172)
[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Isabel V. Hull]]

War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany

2019-09-22T12:42:08Z

Ueberaffe: Created page with "{{Infobox book | name = War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany | author = Robert G. Moeller | publisher = Unive..."

{{Infobox book
| name = War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany

| author = Robert G. Moeller
| publisher = University of California Press
| pub_date = 2001
| pages = 329
| isbn = 0520223268
| image = [[File:Absolute Destruction.jpg|200px|alt=Cover]]
}}

In War Stories, Robert G. Moeller challenges the long-held notion that West Germans simply forgot the Nazi past after the end of World War II. To the contrary, he argues that “West Germans remembered key parts of the first half of the 1940s with extraordinary passion and emotion.” Yet he warns that “remembering selectively was not the same as forgetting.” (p. 16) What West Germans remembered, however, cast themselves—as opposed to those persecuted by the Nazis—as victims of the war. These acts of selective memory, which mainly focused on the plight of POWs in the USSR and those expelled from the east, became “one of the most powerful integrative myths” in the formation of West German national identity in the 1950s. (p. 6)

Chapter One frames Moeller’s premise, serving mostly as an introduction. The second chapter discusses debates over compensation for victims of the Nazis, beginning with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s controversial push for reparations to Israel. Against this backdrop, Moeller describes how West Germans developed new regimes of memory that equated the suffering of Germans with the victims of Nazi atrocities. Indeed, issues of compensation for expellees and POWs took center stage in the 1950s. If those who suffered, and especially suffering Germans, had a face, the perpetrators did not. Moeller observes that “public discussions of the expellees and Soviet-held POWs outlined an agenda for social, economic, psychological, and political reconstruction in the early Federal Republic; they also indicated which moral ledgers of the war’s costs West Germans would leave open and which they would shut and set aside.” (p. 50)

Chapter Three examines the way that West Germans’ selective memories intertwined with historical inquiry. The chapter centers on the multi-volume collection of eyewitness accounts of eastern expellees, titled Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neisse (The expulsion of the German population from the regions east of the Oder-Neisse). This massive work, sponsored by the West German government, sought to “combine coolly objective scholarly analysis with the emotional power of individual victims’ voices.” (p. 55) Led by Theodor Schieder, the project coordinated with local groups of expellees, and told a very lop-sided account of the expulsions. Most tellingly, Moeller observes that “Jews were not invited to speak for themselves” in these accounts, which mostly portrayed Germans as victims of barbarous revenge at the hands of Russians, Poles, and even Jewish partisans. (p. 74)

The fourth chapter examines Adenauer’s trip to Moscow in 1955 and the return of the remaining POWs from the Soviet Union, an event Moeller describes as “the symbolic end of the war.” (p. 89) The return of POWs was marked by much fanfare, and created a sense of national unity despite the fact that Adenauer’s trip to the Soviet capitol made a divided Germany a cold reality. Still, Adenauer’s trip raised his prestige in the Federal Republic. During the trip, Moeller argues, “Adenauer appears not only as a geopolitical strategist but also as a compassionate, if forceful, father, insisting on the release of his nation’s sons.” (p. 91).

In Chapter Five, Moeller analyses seven films that depict the experience of expellees and POWs. These films reinforced West Germans selective memory, and “dramatized parts of the past that West Germans wanted to see.” (p. 127) In the Epilogue, Moeller argues that the legacies of German victimhood became “incorporated into the founding myths of the Federal Republic.” (p. 172)
[[Category:Modern European History]]

[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Isabel V. Hull]]

Modern European History

2019-09-18T21:46:41Z

Ueberaffe:

==Reading Lists==
* [[Old Regime and Revolutionary France, ca. 1650-1800 - Perl-Rosenthal]]

==Book Summaries==
* Jean-Denis Bredin. [[The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus]] (1986)
* M. Brady Brower. [[Unruly Spirits: The Science of Scientific Phenomena in Modern France]] (2010)
* Isabel V. Hull. [[Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany]] (2005)
* John Merriman. [[The Dynamite Club|The Dynamite Club: How A Bombing in Fin-de-Siecle Paris Ignited the Age of Modern Terror]] (2009)
* Frederic Morton. [[A Nervous Splendor: 1888-1889]] (1979)
* Carl E. Schorske. [[Fin-de-Siècle Vienna| Fin-de-Siècle Vienna - Politics and Culture]] (1981)
* Debora Silverman. [[Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology and Style]] (1992)
* Eugen Weber. [[Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914]] (1976)
* Robert G. Moeller. [[War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany]] (2001)

Modern European History

2019-09-18T21:39:17Z

Ueberaffe:

==Reading Lists==
* [[Old Regime and Revolutionary France, ca. 1650-1800 - Perl-Rosenthal]]

==Book Summaries==
* Jean-Denis Bredin. [[The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus]] (1986)
* M. Brady Brower. [[Unruly Spirits: The Science of Scientific Phenomena in Modern France]] (2010)
* Isabel V. Hull. [[Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany]] (2005)
* John Merriman. [[The Dynamite Club|The Dynamite Club: How A Bombing in Fin-de-Siecle Paris Ignited the Age of Modern Terror]] (2009)
* Frederic Morton. [[A Nervous Splendor: 1888-1889]] (1979)
* Carl E. Schorske. [[Fin-de-Siècle Vienna| Fin-de-Siècle Vienna - Politics and Culture]] (1981)
* Debora Silverman. [[Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology and Style]] (1992)
* Eugen Weber. [[Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914]] (1976)
* Robert G. Moeller [[War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany]] (2001)

Slavery in the Cities

2016-08-10T22:01:45Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820 - 1860
| author = Richard C. Wade
| publisher = Oxford University Press
| pub_date = 1964
| pages = 340
| isbn = 0195007557
[[File:Wade_Slavery in the Cities.jpg|200px|thumb|left|]]
}}
Richard C. Wade’s ''Slavery in the Cities'' outlines the structure and challenges of urban slavery, and argues that its decline ultimately sowed the seeds of modern segregation. As southern cities grew, the ‘peculiar instution’ grew with it, to the point where by 1820 slaves comprised some twenty percent of the urban south’s population. Yet by the eve of the Civil War, urban slave populations had drastically declined. Wade’s research demonstrates that the fluidity of city economies and the heterogeneity of urban populations made slavery much harder to maintain than its rural counterpart. Cities, for example, faced the unique, complicating factor of slaves interacting with free blacks. In response, municipal governments developed an ever-tightening “web of restraints” that regulated slaves’ lives, which ultimately ensnared free blacks as well.

Most urban slaves had domestic roles, tending to homes and their owners’ families. Behind that, a large number of urban slaves took on unskilled and semi-skilled labor. Slaves, for example, formed a substantial core of the workforce of the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia. Unlike the rural plantation system, where the bulk of slaves fell under the control of a relative few, urban slavery was diffused across a larger proportion of the population. According to an 1820 census of Charleston, South Carolina, over three fourths of the heads of household owned at least one slave. Slave housing tended tended to be set behind the primary house, off of the street, in a windowless, walled enclosure. The goal was to divert slaves’ attention from the freedoms of city life, though this system often broke down when new working arrangements demanded greater flexibility. A “live out” system developed, where slaves under contract would live closer to the work site.

While such flexibility was beneficial to slave owners, it threatened the stability of the ‘peculiar institution.’ Yet “living out” was the symptom of something that “southerners thought struck at the very heart of the institution”: the “hiring-out” system. If a master owned more slaves than he could use, then he would contract them to short-handed employers. “This custom lessened the rigidity of slavery,” writes Wade, “allowing a constant reallocation of the labor supply according to demand.” Hiring-out made many urban southerners uneasy, however, because it made slaves harder to control.

Under the hiring-out system, slaves could sometimes pocket a portion of their income, which led to an economic freedom that was unthinkable on plantations. Southern cities of the antebellum era hosted a burgeoning demimonde, where slaves, free blacks, and even a few whites caroused and rubbed shoulders. As Wade describes, “an informal life developed among urban slaves which was persistently at odds with state and local law and inconsistent with the institution of slavery.” Places of gathering varied from alleyways and wharves to local shops or even a private residence. Guests would drink, play cards, and socialize. Just as often, these gatherings were places of romantic courtship and, to the horror of local whites, interracial affairs. Not all places of gathering were informal, either. Owners of grog shops and grocery stores openly defied the law to cater to black clientele. The same business owners would even evade consequences by electing amicable city council members or influencing the police toward lax enforcement.

Urban slavery, and its destabilizing characteristics, thus pushed local authorities into a continuous cat-and-mouse game against slaves and those who profited from their limited freedoms. Self-described “citizens’ committees”, private groups who pressured police and newspapers and wrote petitions took up some of this task. Vigilante groups also occasionally roamed the streets to pick up the perceived slack of local authorities. Most of the work was done by municipal authorities: the police and the courts.

In stark contrast to rural slavery, where masters always had the final word, courts exercised broad powers over slaves’ movement and actions. “The owner,” Wade observes, “had no voice in the treatment of slaves before the bench.” Arresting slaves’ growing autonomy required an ever-growing list of rules and statutes. Wade finds strikingly similar patterns in cities across the south, where “the tendency was toward more rules rather than less, toward complexity rather than simplicity, toward harshness rather than leniency.” Curfews, prohibitions of trade, exclusion from establishments and types of conveyance, bans on consuming liquor, and even bans on smoking proliferated, with harsh penalties for violation. Cities commonly controlled slaves’ movements with a pass system that tightly regulated the time and place slaves could be free of their masters’ direct supervision.

Slaves faced a ubiquitous threat of arrest and punishment. “Getting into trouble was just too easy,” writes Wade, “a brush with the law was almost certain." Infractions could be slight, or not even explained. Before the judge, “the routine presumed guilt.” A slave could be sentenced to jail, a workhouse, or even placed on a treadmill. But the most ubiquitous form of punishment for the slave was the lash. “The lash in the white hand on the black back was a symbol of bondage recognized by both races.” Punishment was often a public spectacle, which served the dual purpose of penalizing an individual and reminding other slaves of their place.

Urban slaveowners ultimately decided that the institution was unsustainable. According to Wade, “the distance between the races as well as separation of free colored from slave could not be maintained in the kinetic world of the city.” Though owning slaves rendered enough economic benefits, the difficulty controlling them in an urban milieu threatened the stability of the racial order. Wade finds that slaveowners and local authorities sought three solutions: 1) slaves were sold off to plantations; 2) emancipation procedures were tightened, which limited the number of free blacks in the city; 3) a new series of even tighter regulations were implemented, which Wade argues sowed the seeds of postbellum segregation.

“As the institution of slavery encountered mounting difficulties and, as its control over the blacks weakened,” writes Wade, “another arrangement was devised which maintained great social distance within the physical proximity of town life.” Though many of the exclusions were already in place—public conveyances, public parks, separate seating in theaters and opera houses—these ordinances now made no distinction between slaves and free blacks. Free blacks had long been viewed as a dangerous influence on slaves, and the weakening of slavery undermined what little legal status they had.

''Slavery in the Cities'' is a thoroughly argued piece that relies on a wealth of primary sources, including court records, police dockets, real-estate conveyances, tax and assessment books, minutes of city councils, municipal ordinances, and local newspapers. Its only salient flaw is that it does not engage in any direct dialogue with, or frame itself in the context of, the existing historiography. Wade’s thesis, that Jim Crow’s foundation of social terror and surveillance took root in the antebellum era, was a direct challenge to C. Vann Woodward. In The ''Strange Career of Jim Crow'', arguably one of the most influential studies of southern segregation, Woodward not only states that “segregation would have been impractical under slavery”, but he also conjures a picture of a fleeting crossroads in the postbellum era where the races mingled and segregation was hardly inevitable. Wade’s study makes Woodward’s assertions harder to accept at face value, and that is the real contribution of ''Slavery in the Cities''.
[[Category:Nineteenth Century United States]]
[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Richard C. Wade]]

Slavery in the Cities

2016-08-10T19:21:45Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820 - 1860
| author = Richard C. Wade
| publisher = Oxford University Press
| pub_date = 1964
| pages = 340
| isbn = 0195007557
[[File:Wade_Slavery in the Cities.jpg|200px|thumb|left|]]
}}
Richard C. Wade’s ''Slavery in the Cities'' outlines the structure and challenges of urban slavery, and argues that its decline ultimately sowed the seeds of modern segregation. As southern cities grew, the ‘peculiar instution’ grew with it, to the point where by 1820 slaves comprised some twenty percent of the urban south’s population. Yet by the eve of the Civil War, urban slave populations had drastically declined. Wade’s research demonstrates that the fluidity of city economies and the heterogeneity of urban populations made slavery much harder to maintain than its rural counterpart. Cities, for example, faced the unique, complicating factor of slaves interacting with free blacks. In response, municipal governments developed an ever-tightening “web of restraints” that regulated slaves’ lives, which ultimately ensnared free blacks as well.

Most urban slaves had domestic roles, tending to homes and their owners’ families. Behind that, a large number of urban slaves took on unskilled and semi-skilled labor. Slaves, for example, formed a substantial core of the workforce of the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia. Unlike the rural plantation system, where the bulk of slaves fell under the control of a relative few, urban slavery was diffused across a larger proportion of the population. According to an 1820 census of Charleston, South Carolina, over three fourths of the heads of household owned at least one slave. Slave housing tended tended to be set behind the primary house, off of the street, in a windowless, walled enclosure. The goal was to divert slaves’ attention from the freedoms of city life, though this system often broke down when new working arrangements demanded greater flexibility. A “live out” system developed, where slaves under contract would live closer to the work site.

While such flexibility was beneficial to slave owners, it threatened the stability of the ‘peculiar institution.’ Yet “living out” was the symptom of something that “southerners thought struck at the very heart of the institution”: the “hiring-out” system. If a master owned more slaves than he could use, then he would contract them to short-handed employers. “This custom lessened the rigidity of slavery,” writes Wade, “allowing a constant reallocation of the labor supply according to demand.” Hiring-out made many urban southerners uneasy, however, because it made slaves harder to control.

Under the hiring-out system, slaves could sometimes pocket a portion of their income, which led to an economic freedom that was unthinkable on plantations. Southern cities of the antebellum era hosted a burgeoning demimonde, where slaves, free blacks, and even a few whites caroused and rubbed shoulders. As Wade describes, “an informal life developed among urban slaves which was persistently at odds with state and local law and inconsistent with the institution of slavery.” Places of gathering varied from alleyways and wharves to local shops or even a private residence. Guests would drink, play cards, and socialize. Just as often, these gatherings were places of romantic courtship and, to the horror of local whites, interracial affairs. Not all places of gathering were informal, either. Owners of grog shops and grocery stores openly defied the law to cater to black clientele. The same business owners would even evade consequences by electing amicable city council members or influencing the police toward lax enforcement.

Urban slavery, and its destabilizing characteristics, thus pushed local authorities into a continuous cat-and-mouse game against slaves and those who profited from their limited freedoms. Self-described “citizens’ committees”, private groups who pressured police and newspapers and wrote petitions took up some of this task. Vigilante groups also occasionally roamed the streets to pick up the perceived slack of local authorities. Most of the work was done by municipal authorities: the police and the courts.

In stark contrast to rural slavery, where masters always had the final word, courts exercised broad powers over slaves’ movement and actions. “The owner,” Wade observes, “had no voice in the treatment of slaves before the bench.” Arresting slaves’ growing autonomy required an ever-growing list of rules and statutes. Wade finds strikingly similar patterns in cities across the south, where “the tendency was toward more rules rather than less, toward complexity rather than simplicity, toward harshness rather than leniency.” Curfews, prohibitions of trade, exclusion from establishments and types of conveyance, bans on consuming liquor, and even bans on smoking proliferated, with harsh penalties for violation. Cities commonly controlled slaves’ movements with a pass system that tightly regulated the time and place slaves could be free of their masters’ direct supervision.

Slaves faced a ubiquitous threat of arrest and punishment. “Getting into trouble was just too easy,” writes Wade, “a brush with the law was almost certain." Infractions could be slight, or not even explained. Before the judge, “the routine presumed guilt.” A slave could be sentenced to jail, a workhouse, or even placed on a treadmill. But the most ubiquitous form of punishment for the slave was the lash. “The lash in the white hand on the black back was a symbol of bondage recognized by both races.” Punishment was often a public spectacle, which served the dual purpose of penalizing an individual and reminding other slaves of their place.

Urban slaveowners ultimately decided that the institution was unsustainable. According to Wade, “the distance between the races as well as separation of free colored from slave could not be maintained in the kinetic world of the city.” Though owning slaves rendered enough economic benefits, the difficulty controlling them in an urban milieu threatened the stability of the racial order. Wade finds that slaveowners and local authorities sought three solutions: 1) slaves were sold off to plantations; 2) emancipation procedures were tightened, which limited the number of free blacks in the city; 3) a new series of even tighter regulations were implemented, which Wade argues sowed the seeds of postbellum segregation.

“As the institution of slavery encountered mounting difficulties and, as its control over the blacks weakened,” writes Wade, “another arrangement was devised which maintained great social distance within the physical proximity of town life.” Though many of the exclusions were already in place by custom—public conveyances, public parks, separate seating in theaters and opera houses—they now became explicit law. The key distinction was that, in addition to slaves, these new regulations fell on free blacks with equal harshness. Free blacks had long been viewed as a dangerous influence on slaves, and the weakening of slavery undermined what little legal status they had.

''Slavery in the Cities'' is a thoroughly argued piece that relies on a wealth of primary sources, including court records, police dockets, real-estate conveyances, tax and assessment books, minutes of city councils, municipal ordinances, and local newspapers. Its only salient flaw is that it does not engage in any direct dialogue with, or frame itself in the context of, the existing historiography. Wade’s thesis, that Jim Crow’s foundation of social terror and surveillance took root in the antebellum era, was a direct challenge to C. Vann Woodward. In The ''Strange Career of Jim Crow'', arguably one of the most influential studies of southern segregation, Woodward not only states that “segregation would have been impractical under slavery”, but he also conjures a picture of a fleeting crossroads in the postbellum era where the races mingled and segregation was hardly inevitable. Wade’s study makes Woodward’s assertions harder to accept at face value, and that is the real contribution of ''Slavery in the Cities''.
[[Category:Nineteenth Century United States]]
[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Richard C. Wade]]

Slavery in the Cities

2016-08-10T19:19:58Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820 - 1860
| author = Richard C. Wade
| publisher = Oxford University Press
| pub_date = 1964
| pages = 340
| isbn = 0195007557
[[File:Wade_Slavery in the Cities.jpg|200px|thumb|left|]]
}}
Richard C. Wade’s ''Slavery in the Cities'' outlines the structure and challenges of urban slavery, and argues that its decline ultimately sowed the seeds of modern segregation. As southern cities grew, the ‘peculiar instution’ grew with it, to the point where by 1820 slaves comprised some twenty percent of the urban south’s population. Yet by the eve of the Civil War, urban slave populations had drastically declined. Wade’s research demonstrates that the fluidity of city economies and the heterogeneity of urban populations made slavery much harder to maintain than its rural counterpart. Cities, for example, faced the unique, complicating factor of slaves interacting with free blacks. In response, municipal governments developed an ever-tightening “web of restraints” that regulated slaves’ lives, which ultimately ensnared free blacks as well.

Most urban slaves had domestic roles, tending to homes and their owners’ families. Behind that, a large number of urban slaves took on unskilled and semi-skilled labor. Slaves, for example, formed a substantial core of the workforce of the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia. Unlike the rural plantation system, where the bulk of slaves fell under the control of a relative few, urban slavery was diffused across a larger proportion of the population. According to an 1820 census of Charleston, South Carolina, over three fourths of the heads of household owned at least one slave. Slave housing tended tended to be set behind the primary house, off of the street, in a windowless, walled enclosure. The goal was to divert slaves’ attention from the freedoms of city life, though this system often broke down when new working arrangements demanded greater flexibility. A “live out” system developed, where slaves under contract would live closer to the work site.

While such flexibility was beneficial to slave owners, it threatened the stability of the ‘peculiar institution.’ Yet “living out” was the symptom of something that “southerners thought struck at the very heart of the institution”: the “hiring-out” system. If a master owned more slaves than he could use, then he would contract them to short-handed employers. “This custom lessened the rigidity of slavery,” writes Wade, “allowing a constant reallocation of the labor supply according to demand.” Hiring-out made many urban southerners uneasy, however, because it made slaves harder to control.

Under the hiring-out system, slaves could sometimes pocket a portion of their income, which led to an economic freedom that was unthinkable on plantations. Southern cities of the antebellum era hosted a burgeoning demimonde, where slaves, free blacks, and even a few whites caroused and rubbed shoulders. As Wade describes, “an informal life developed among urban slaves which was persistently at odds with state and local law and inconsistent with the institution of slavery.” Places of gathering varied from alleyways and wharves to local shops or even a private residence. Guests would drink, play cards, and socialize. Just as often, these gatherings were places of romantic courtship and, to the horror of local whites, interracial affairs. Not all places of gathering were informal, either. Owners of grog shops and grocery stores openly defied the law to cater to black clientele. The same business owners would even evade consequences by electing amicable city council members or influencing the police toward lax enforcement.

Urban slavery, and its destabilizing characteristics, thus pushed local authorities into a continuous cat-and-mouse game against slaves and those who profited from their limited freedoms. Self-described “citizens’ committees”, private groups who pressured police and newspapers and wrote petitions took up some of this task. Vigilante groups also occasionally roamed the streets to pick up the perceived slack of local authorities. Most of the work was done by municipal authorities: the police and the courts.

In stark contrast to rural slavery, where masters always had the final word, courts exercised broad powers over slaves’ movement and actions. “The owner,” Wade observes, “had no voice in the treatment of slaves before the bench.” Arresting slaves’ growing autonomy required an ever-growing list of rules and statutes. Wade finds strikingly similar patterns in cities across the south, where “the tendency was toward more rules rather than less, toward complexity rather than simplicity, toward harshness rather than leniency.” Curfews, prohibitions of trade, exclusion from establishments and types of conveyance, bans on consuming liquor, and even bans on smoking proliferated, with harsh penalties for violation. Cities commonly controlled slaves’ movements with a pass system that tightly regulated the time and place slaves could be free of their masters’ direct supervision.

Slaves faced a ubiquitous threat of arrest and punishment. “Getting into trouble was just too easy,” writes Wade, “a brush with the law was almost certain." Infractions could be slight, or not even explained. Before the judge, “the routine presumed guilt.” A slave could be sentenced to jail, a workhouse, or even placed on a treadmill. But the most ubiquitous form of punishment for the slave was the lash. “The lash in the white hand on the black back was a symbol of bondage recognized by both races.” Punishment was often a public spectacle, which served the dual purpose of penalizing an individual and reminding other slaves of their place.

Urban slaveowners ultimately decided that the institution was unsustainable. According to Wade, “the distance between the races as well as separation of free colored from slave could not be maintained in the kinetic world of the city.” Though owning slaves rendered enough economic benefits, the difficulty controlling them in an urban milieu threatened the stability of the racial order. Wade finds that slaveowners and local authorities sought three solutions: 1) slaves were sold off to plantations; 2) emancipation procedures were tightened, which limited the number of free blacks in the city; 3) a new series of even tighter regulations were implemented, which Wade argues sowed the seeds of postbellum segregation.

“As the institution of slavery encountered mounting difficulties and, as its control over the blacks weakened,” writes Wade, “another arrangement was devised which maintained great social distance within the physical proximity of town life.” Though many of the exclusions were already in place by custom—public conveyances, public parks, separate seating in theaters and opera houses—they now became explicit law. The key distinction was that, in addition to slaves, these new regulations fell on free blacks with equal harshness. Free blacks had long been viewed as a dangerous influence on slaves, and the weakening of slavery undermined what little legal status they had.

Slavery in the Cities is a thoroughly argued piece that relies on a wealth of primary sources, including court records, police dockets, real-estate conveyances, tax and assessment books, minutes of city councils, municipal ordinances, and local newspapers. Its only salient flaw is that it does not engage in any direct dialogue with, or frame itself in the context of, the existing historiography. Wade’s thesis, that Jim Crow’s foundation of social terror and surveillance took root in the antebellum era, was a direct challenge to C. Vann Woodward. In The ''Strange Career of Jim Crow'', arguably one of the most influential studies of southern segregation, Woodward not only states that “segregation would have been impractical under slavery”, but he also conjures a picture of a fleeting crossroads in the postbellum era where the races mingled and segregation was hardly inevitable. Wade’s study makes Woodward’s assertions harder to accept at face value, and that is the real contribution of ''Slavery in the Cities''.
[[Category:Nineteenth Century United States]]
[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Richard C. Wade]]

Slavery in the Cities

2016-08-09T18:43:11Z

Ueberaffe: Created page with "{{Infobox book | name = Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820 - 1860 | author = Richard C. Wade | publisher = Oxford University Press | pub_date = 1964 |..."

{{Infobox book
| name = Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820 - 1860
| author = Richard C. Wade
| publisher = Oxford University Press
| pub_date = 1964
| pages = 340
| isbn = 0195007557
[[File:Wade_Slavery in the Cities.jpg|200px|thumb|left|]]
}}
Richard C. Wade’s Slavery in the Cities outlines the structure and challenges of urban slavery, and argues that its decline ultimately sowed the seeds of modern segregation. As southern cities grew, the ‘peculiar instution’ grew with it, to the point where by 1820 slaves comprised some twenty percent of the urban south’s population. Yet by the eve of the Civil War, urban slave populations had drastically declined. Wade’s research demonstrates that the fluidity of city economies and the heterogeneity of urban populations made slavery much harder to maintain than its rural counterpart. Cities, for example, faced the unique, complicating factor of slaves interacting with free blacks. In response, municipal governments developed an ever-tightening “web of restraints” that regulated slaves’ lives, which ultimately ensnared free blacks as well.

Most urban slaves had domestic roles, tending to homes and their owners’ families. Behind that, a large number of urban slaves took on unskilled and semi-skilled labor. Slaves, for example, formed a substantial core of the workforce of the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia. Unlike the rural plantation system, where the bulk of slaves fell under the control of a relative few, urban slavery was diffused across a larger proportion of the population. According to an 1820 census of Charleston, South Carolina, over three fourths of the heads of household owned at least one slave. Slave housing tended tended to be set behind the primary house, off of the street, in a windowless, walled enclosure. The goal was to divert slaves’ attention from the freedoms of city life, though this system often broke down when new working arrangements demanded greater flexibility. A “live out” system developed, where slaves under contract would live closer to the work site.

While such flexibility was beneficial to slave owners, it made threatened the stability of the ‘peculiar institution.’ Yet “living out” was the symptom of something that “Southerners thought struck at the very heart of the institution”: the “hiring-out” system. If a master owned more slaves than he could use, then he would contract slaves to short-handed employers. “This custom lessened the rigidity of slavery,” writes Wade, “allowing a constant reallocation of the labor supply according to demand.” Hiring-out made many urban southerners uneasy, however, because it made slaves harder to control.

Under the hiring out system, slaves could sometimes pocket a portion of their income, which led to an economic freedom that was unthinkable on the plantation. Southern cities of the antebellum era hosted a burgeoning demimonde, where slaves, free blacks, and even a few whites caroused and rubbed shoulders. As Wade describes, “an informal life developed among urban slaves which was persistently at odds with state and local law and inconistent with the institution of slavery.” Places of gathering varied from alleyways and wharves to local shops or even a private residence. Guests would drink, play cards, and socialize. Just as often, these gatherings were places of romantic courtship and, to the horror of local whites, interracial affairs. Not all places of gathering were in formal, either. Owners of grog shops and grocery stores openly defied the law to cater to black clientele. The same business owners would even evade consequences by electing amicable city council members or influencing the police toward lax enforcement.

Urban slavery, and its destabilizing characteristics, thus pushed local authorities into a continuous cat-and-mouse game against slaves and those who profited from their limited freedoms. Self-described “citizens’ committees”, private groups who pressured police and newspapers and wrote petitions took up some of this task. Vigilante groups also occasionally roamed the streets to pick up the perceived slack of local authorities. Most of the work was done by municipal authorities: the police and the courts.

In stark contrast to rural slavery, where masters always had the final word, courts exercised broad powers over slaves’ movement and actions. “The owner,” Wade observes, “had no voice in the treatment of slaves before the bench.” Arresting slaves’ growing autonomy required an ever-growing list of rules and statutes. Wade finds strikingly similar patterns in southern cities where “the tendency was toward more rules rather than less, toward complexity rather than simplicity, toward harshness rather than leniency.” Curfews, prohibitions of trade, exclusion from establishments and types of conveyance, bans on consuming liquor, and even bans on smoking proliferated, with harsh penalties for violation. Cities commonly controlled slaves’ movements with a pass system that tightly regulated the time and place slaves could be free of their masters’ direct supervision.

Slaves faced a ubiquitous threat of arrest and punishment. “Getting into trouble was just too easy,” writes Wade, “a brush with the law was almost certain. Infractions could be slight, or not even explained. Before the judge, “the routine presumed guilt.” A slave could be sentenced to jail, a workhouse, or even placed on a treadmill. But the most ubiquitous symbol of punishment for the slave was the lash. “The lash in the white hand on the black back was a symbol of bondage recognized by both races.” Punishment was often a public spectacle, which served the dual purpose of penalizing an individual and reminding other slaves of their place.

Urban slaveowners ultimately decided that the institution was unsustainable. According to Wade, “the distance between the races as well as separation of free colored from slave could not be maintained in the kinetic world of the city.” Though owning slaves rendered enough economic benefits, the difficulty controlling them in an urban milieu threatened the stability of the racial order. Wade finds that slaveowners and local authorities sought three solutions: 1) slaves were sold off to plantations; 2) emancipation procedures were tightened, which limited the number of free blacks in the city; 3) a new series of even tighter regulations were implemented, which Wade argues sowed the seeds of postbellum segregation.

“As the institution of slavery encountered mounting difficulties and, as its control over the blacks weakened,” writes Wade, “another arrangement was devised which maintained great social distance within the physical proximity of town life.” Though many of the exclusions were already in place by custom—public conveyances, public parks, separate seating in theaters and opera houses—they now became explicit law. The key distinction was that, in addition to slaves, these new regulations fell on free blacks with equal harshness. Free blacks had long been viewed as a dangerous influence on slaves, and the weakening of slavery undermined what little legal status they had.

Slavery in the Cities is a thoroughly argued piece that relies on a wealth of primary sources, including court records, police dockets, real-estate conveyances, tax and assessment books, minutes of city councils, municipal ordi- nances, and local newspapers. Its only salient flaw is that it does not engage in any direct dialogue with, or frame itself in the context of, the existing historiography. Wade’s thesis, that Jim Crow’s foundation of social terror and surveillance took root in the antebellum era, was a direct challenge to C. Vann Woodward. In The Strange Career of Jim Crow, arguably one of the most influential studies of southern segregation, Woodward not only states that “segregation would have been impractical under slavery”, but he also conjures a picture of a fleeting crossroads in the postbellum era where the races mingled and segregation was not inevitable. Wade’s study makes Woodward’s assertions harder to accept at face value, and that is the real contribution of Slavery in the Cities.
[[Category:Nineteenth Century United States]]
[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Richard C. Wade]]

File:Wade Slavery in the Cities.jpg

2016-08-09T18:41:11Z

Ueberaffe:

Race Relations in the Urban South

2016-08-09T18:38:36Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Race Relations in the Urban South: 1865 - 1890
| author = Howard N. Rabinowitz
| publisher = Oxford University Press
| pub_date = 1978
| pages = 441
| isbn = 0195022831
[[File:Race_Relations_in_the_Urban_South.jpg|200px|thumb|left|]]
}}
Race Relations in the Urban South traces the origins of segregation and the conceit of “separate but equal.” Rabinowitz finds that the influx of emancipated slaves into southern cities created new frictions among white democrats, white rebublicans, and newly-freed blacks. Segrgegation offered an uneasy compromise between the three parties. White democrats sought new ways to control blacks in lieu of slavery. Republicans strove to balance their appeal to white voters with a degree of support for blacks. Burgeoning black communities looked for whatever social and political gains they could find, and many viewed separation as an improvement over exclusion. “Separate but equal”, however, offered much more in theory than practice, and, by the end of the nineteenth century, most of what blacks gained during Reconstruction had been reversed.

The Thirteenth Amendment may have abolished slavery, but it did not erase the culture of white supremacy that justified it. White southerners commonly believed that black men and women had needed slavery to make them civilized. As large numbers of freed slaves migrated to southern cities, in which antebellum blacks had been scarce, whites look for different ways to keep them in check. A chief method was a legal system that held whites and blacks to different standards, even when race was not an explicit criterion of the the law. Rabinowitz argues that “a higher percentage [of blacks] were arrested and convicted of crimes and their sentences were more severe than those of whites charged with comparable offenses.” Vagrancy laws primarily targeted the large numbers of unemployed urban blacks in the years immediately following the Civil War. The Black Codes, many of which did not specifically mention race, regulated African-American life in the South in ways that ranged from prohibiting interacial rmarriage to barring blacks from selling liquor or owning firearms.

Blacks in southern cities also faced harsh geographic and economic discrimination, as they were largely confined to the poorest sections of cities. City councils would manipulate building codes to prevent specific types of homes from being built in certain areas. Tenements and lower quality homes were permitted in black areas, whereas sturdier homes were erected in white areas. Black neighborhoods also lacked streetlights, sewer systems, and basic sanitation, which made inhabitants more vulnerable to illness and health problems. Relegating blacks to the bottom of the economy also insured they would not be able to afford to live among whites. Rabinowitz finds that “the great mass of blacks were mired in low-paying, irregular, and low-status positions known as ‘negro jobs.’” Fearing economic competition, whites excluded blacks from skilled labor. Organized labor offered no help, either, because unions were afraid of alienating white workers. Yet economic poverty does not give a complete picture of the origins of segregation.

Rabinowitz finds that middle-class and even wealthy blacks, though relatively few in number, formed an essential part of the post-bellum order. For segregation to be effective, blacks needed a parallel system of commerce and finance. Whites supported the development of black banks, insurance companies, and merchants, so long as they did not threaten white businesses. Still, the development of a small black upper and middle class enabled blacks to invest in their own community, although this modest economic power was never enough to leverage real political gains. However, this parallel system reveals Rabinowitz’s most startling observation of the “separate but equal” construct: many blacks welcomed segregation because they viewed it as an improvement over slavery.

To be clear, Rabinowitz finds no evidence that blacks were content with Jim Crow. Some progress, though, was better than none, and a nominally separate but equal society offered more than the regime of exclusion that had defined slavery. “The professed policy of separate but equal,” Rabinowitz argues, “had the benefit of minimizing white hostility while still presenting the blacks with a significant improvement over their treatment at the hands of earlier administrations.” Segregation did not put blacks on equal footing with whites, but it did create spaces that bore less scrutiny. Black neighborhoods, for example, “brought together large numbers of negroes in areas that whites could not easily control.”
Blacks under the “separate but equal” regime nonetheless suffered frequent indignity and discrimination. While most explicit segregation laws were not passed until after 1890, “de facto segregation generally prevailed.” Streetcar owners in Nashville, for example, opted to provide segregated cars. Many hotels, theaters, and restaurants excluded blacks altogether, and staking rinks billed themselves as establishments for “ladies” and “gentlemen.” After the passage of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, blacks were able to challenge these practices with some success, but none of these gains were profound. Violent attacks by lynch mobs or individual whites generally went unpunished and, though Rabinowitz finds that the former did not occur often in the first quarter century of the antebellum, the threat of this form of retribution was still a potent tool for controlling blacks.

Rabinowitz argues that, though demeaning and cruel, the hollow promise of “separate but equal” was the most that blacks could practically hope for in the first twenty-five years after the Civil War. “Given the opposition of southern whites, it seems unlikely that the Republicans, even if they had wanted to, could have forced integration on the South.” Despite the misgivings of many southern Republicans, and fierce resistance from Democrats, the military and the Freedman’s Bureau managed to enforce black suffrage in 1868. As a result, some cities elected black officials for the first time and blacks were also appointed to positions of patronage, but such gains were short lived. One of the reasons for the victory of the Redeemers was that Republicans would only go so far in supporting blacks for fear of alienating white voters. A prime example of this pattern was white republicans lackluster support of the 1875 Civil Rights Act. On occasion, disillusioned blacks even cast protest votes for Democrats to remind Republicans that they should not be taken for granted.

From the outset, Democrats looked for ways to limit blacks’ access to the ballot box. As long as the North or a robust Republican party maintained a presence, the Redemeers’ success could only be partial, but their efforts were tireless. Long before the end of Reconstruction, Redeemers sought to disenfranchise blacks through a “mixture of fraud, intimidation, and, most important, legislative manipulation.” Democrats at polling places frequently stuffed ballot boxes and disregarded republican ballots. White employers often threatened to fire black employees if they did not vote Democratic. But legislative manipulation was the most effective means of disenfranchising black voters.

Redeemer-controlled state legistlatures devised a seemingly endless list of strategies. The white primary became a staple of Southern states, as did gerrymandering. In 1870, Georgia switched to a ward system that insured white voting blocs would always outnumber that of blacks. Montgomery, Alabama convinced state legislators to reduce the boundaries of the city so that the black neighborhoods on the edge of town were no longer eligible to participate in local elections. Poll taxes, separate lines and ballot boxes, and complicated voting procedures were also part of the strategy to disenfranchise black voters. Rabinowitz concludes that, “the disenfranchisement of the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth century was the logical culmination of white thinking sense the onset of Reconstruction.”

Rabinowitz’s principal finding in Race Relations in the Urban South is that the seeds of Jim Crow had been planted before the ink of the thirteenth amendment was dry. The legal mechanisms of Reconstruction did nothing to diminish a deeply entrenched culture of white supremacy. Republicans in the South found that they could only offer limited support to blacks without alienating white voters. Still, for many blacks, segregation offered more opportunities than slavery, and the few blacks who grew comfortable in the late 19th century exploited these small advantages to invest in their own communities. In the end though, Reconstruction left blacks with weak protection while offering the Redeemers a series of shrinking hurdles.

[[Category:Nineteenth Century United States]]
[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Howard Rabinowitz]]

Nineteeth Century United States

2016-08-09T18:36:54Z

Ueberaffe:

==Book Summaries==
* Philip S. Klein. [[President James Buchanan| President James Buchanan: A Biography]] (1962).
* Menahem Blondheim. [[News over the Wires|News over the Wires: The Telegraph and the Flow of Public Information in America, 1844-1897]] (1994).
* Paul Boyer. [[Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920]] (1992).
* Amy Bridges. [[A City in the Republic|A City in the Republic: Antebellum New York and the Origins of Machine Politics]] (2008).
* Francis G. Couvares. [[The Remaking of Pittsburgh|The Remaking of Pittsburgh: Class and Culture in an Industrializing City 1877-1919]] (1984).
* Albert Bricker. [[Democracy of Soundz|Democracy of Sound: Music Piracy and the Remaking of American Copyright in the Twentieth Century]]
* Robin L. Einhorn. [[Property Rules|Property Rules: Political Economy in Chicago, 1833-1872]] (2001).
* Philip J. Ethington. [[The Public City|The Public City: The Political Construction of Urban Life in San Francisco, 1850-1900]] (2001).
* Ann Fabian. [[Card Sharps and Bucket Shops|Card Sharps and Bucket Shops: Gambling in Nineteenth-Century America]] (1999).
* Eric Foner. [[Reconstruction|Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877]] (2002).
* Gary Gallagher and Alan Nolan (ed). [[The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History|The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History]] (2000).
* Eugene D. Genovese. [[Roll, Jordan, Roll|Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made]] (1976).
* Paul Gilroy [http://tropicsofmeta.wordpress.com/2012/12/11/the-modern-paul-gilroy-modernity-transnationalism-and-the-impact-of-the-black-atlantic-on-history/ The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness] (1993).
* Steven Hahn. [[A Nation under Our Feet|A Nation under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration]] (2005).
* Harper-Ho, V. [[Noncitizen Voting Rights|Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current Prospects for Change]]. Immigr. & Nat’lity L. Rev., 21, 477. (2000).
* Steven Hertzberg. [[Strangers Within the Gate City|Strangers Within the Gate City: The Jews of Atlanta, 1845-1915]] (1978).
* Thomas R. Hietala. [[Manifest Design|Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire]] (2002).
* Richard Hofstadter. [[The American Political Tradition|The American Political Tradition: And the Men Who Made it]] (1989).
* Richard Hofstadter.[[Social Darwinism in American Thought]] (1992).
* John R. Hornady.[[Atlanta, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow]] (1922).
* Amy Kaplan.[[The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture]] (2005).
* Larry D. Kramer, [[The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review]] (2004).
* Drew R. McCoy. [[The Elusive Republic|The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America]] (1996).
* Pearson, R. [[Towards an Historical Model of Services Innovation|Towards an Historical Model of Services Innovation: The Case of the Insurance Industry, 1700–1914]]. The Economic History Review, 50(2) , 235–256. (1997).
* Wallace Putnam Reed. [[History of Atlanta, Georgia|History of Atlanta, Georgia: with illustrations and biographical sketches of some of its prominent men and pioneers]] (2011).
* Heather Cox Richardson. [[The Death of Reconstruction|The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil War North, 1865-1901]] (2004).
* Daniel T. Rodgers. [[Contested Truths|Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics Since Independence]] (1998).
* Mary P. Ryan. [[Women in Public|Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825-1880]] (1992).
* Allison L. Sneider. [[Suffragists in an Imperial Age|Suffragists in an Imperial Age: U.S. Expansion and the Woman Question, 1870-1929]] (2008).
* Christine Stansell. [[City of Women|City of Women: Sex and Class in New York, 1789-1860]] (1987).
* Jr, Sam Bass Warner. [[The Private City|The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth]] (1987).
* Sean Wilentz. [[Chants Democratic|Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850, 20th Anniversary Edition]] (1984).
* T. Harry Williams.[[Lincoln and His Generals]] (1952).
*Zimmerman, Andrew. [http://tropicsofmeta.wordpress.com/2011/09/26/the-ties-that-bind-the-transnational-trick-of-immobilizing-the-mobile/ Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South] (2010).
* Wendy Hamand Venet. [[A Changing Wind|A Changing Wind: Commerce and Conflict in Civil War Atlanta]] (2014).
* Claudio Saunt. [[Black, White, and Indian|Black, White, and Indian: Race and the Unmasking of an American Family]] (2005).
* Leon Litwack. [[North of Slavery|North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States: 1790 – 1860]] (1961).
* Howard N. Rabinowitz. [[Race Relations in the Urban South|Race Relations in the Urban South: 1865 – 1890]] (1978).
* Richard C. Wade. [[Slavery in the Cities|Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820 - 1860]] (1964).

North of Slavery

2016-07-24T20:14:21Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States: 1790 – 1860
| author = Leon Litwack
| publisher = University of Chicago Press
| pub_date = 1961
| pages = 325
| isbn = 0226485862
[[File:Name of File.jpg|150px|alt=image]]
}}
Litwack’s examination of the treatment of African-Americans in northern states prior to the Civil War shows that freedom from slavery did not guarantee a status comparable to that of white citizens. Though slaves in the South faced more explicit deprivation of rights, “even the more subtle forms of twentieth-century racial discrimination had their antecedents in the ante bellum North.” In fact, northern whites and their political representatives actively discriminated against African-Americans because they believed that the two races were naturally unequal.

Litwack is careful not to overstate his case. Northern African-Americans had more rights than slaves, and many northern whites opposed slavery. That said, “most northern whites would maintain a careful distinction between granting Negroes legal protection . . .and political and social equality.” Patterns of discrimination were not uniform among the different states but, in sum effect, the psychology of prejudice combined with legal measures to “restrict northern negroes in virtually every phase of existence.” This system undermined northern politicians who sought to regulate slavery at the Federal level. On the floor of the House of Representatives, one congressman from Virginia once demanded: “Go home, and emancipate your free negroes. When you do that, we will listen to you with more patience.”

African-Americans in the North had little political recourse, as they were excluded from voting and participation in the court system. As suffrage expanded in the Jacksonian Era, it often came at the price of insuring African-American exclusion. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont granted equal voting rights, but they only accounted for some six percent of the entire northern African-American population. Several northern states prohibited African-Americans from testifying against whites in court, and many more barred them from serving on juries. As a result, justice in northern states took on a “two-sided nature”, where sentencing for African-Americans was disproportionately harsher.

According to Litwack, political exclusion had profound psychological, social, and economic impacts. Segregated school systems weakened education and literacy, which had a dual effect of impeding political mobilization and severely limiting African-Americans’ opportunities in the labor market. Relegating African-Americans to mostly menial jobs also meant that they could only afford to live in the poorest neighborhoods. Efforts to move into better homes, even when it could be afforded, aroused threats and even violents from white residents. “The vigorous exclusion of Negroes from white residential neighborhoods,” Litwack concludes, “made escape from the ghetto virtually impossible.” In turn, economic and social exclustion made it very difficult for many African-Americans to feel much optimism towards a better future. In short, northern whites viewed blacks as inferior, and they developed a system to reinforce this notion.

Unlike the South, however, the North hosted a robust abolitionist movement, though prevailing racial prejuces undermined it. Some abolitionists made more of a cause of ending southern slavery than improving conditions of free blacks. Many of those who did advocate for northern blacks made a careful distinction between granting civil protections and promoting integration. The Philadelphia antislavery society voted by only a very narrow margin to admit black members, but nonetheless proclaimed that it was not their “object, or duty to encourage social intercourse between colored and white families.” Litwack also observes that “abolitionist literature contributed its share to the popular conception of the Negro, frequently referring to his meek, servile, comical, minstrel-like qualities.”

African-Americans openly participated in northern abolititionism, which was an unthinkable option in the South. “Negro abolitionism,” writes Litwack, “preceded by several years the appearance of [William Lloyd] Garrison and The Liberator.” Naturally, black abolitionist leaders felt frustrated by the fact that they were frequently marginalized by a movement that purported to help them. Others also saw a real liability in hitching the fate of emancipation to a white-dominated movement. In his final analysis, Litwack takes an optimistic view of the divisions within abolitionism. While acknowledging the “factionalism, extreme partisanship, narrow class attitudes, prejudice, and even hypocrisy” of the movement, he argues that it “shared these weaknesses with nearly every organized social movement and political party in antebellum America.” “The fact that abolitionists did not allow these weaknesses to interfere materially with their struggle for civil rights is at least a tribute to their sincerity.”

Litwack clearly broke new ground with this study, and his thesis is well supported. Though it may be unfair to ask that he achieve something different from his original aim, his work still leaves a reader to wonder about the origins and evolution of this system. A few other questions are also worth asking: what were the impacts of Dred Scott and Plessy vs. Ferguson? Both cases, though significant in their shaping of American race relations, receive little attention from Litwack here. Most importantly, what was the relationship between northern systems of exclusion and southern slavery? Aside from weakening abolitionism, did they influence one another?

In short, it appears that North of Slavery is an effective piece of historiography in that it provokes questions about its chosen topic and inspires further research.

[[Category:Nineteenth Century United States]]
[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Leon Litwack]]

North of Slavery

2016-07-24T19:26:43Z

Ueberaffe:

North of Slavery

2016-07-24T19:23:57Z

Ueberaffe:

Race Relations in the Urban South

2016-07-22T19:39:41Z

Ueberaffe:

Race Relations in the Urban South

2016-07-21T22:04:36Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Race Relations in the Urban South: 1865 - 1890
| author = Howard N. Rabinowitz
| publisher = Oxford University Press
| pub_date = 1978
| pages = 441
| isbn = 0195022831
[[File:Race_Relations_in_the_Urban_South.jpg|200px|thumb|left|]]
}}
Race Relations in the Urban South traces the origins of segregation and the conceit of “separate but equal.” Rabinowitz finds that the influx of emancipated slaves into southern cities created new frictions among white democrats, white rebublicans, and newly-freed blacks. Segrgegation offered an uneasy compromise between the three parties. White democrats sought new ways to control blacks in lieu of slavery. Republicans strove to balance their appeal to white voters with a degree of support for blacks. Burgeoning black communities looked for whatever social and political gains they could find, and many viewed separation as an improvement over exclusion. “Separate but equal”, however, offered much more in theory than practice, and, by the end of the nineteenth century, most of what blacks gained during Reconstruction had been reversed.

The Thirteenth Amendment may have abolished slavery, but it did not erase the culture of white supremacy that justified it. White southerners commonly believed that black men and women had needed slavery to make them civilized. As large numbers of freed slaves migrated to southern cities, in which antebellum blacks had been scarce, whites look for different ways to keep them in check. A chief method was a legal system that held whites and blacks to different standards, even when race was not an explicit criterion of the the law. Rabinowitz argues that “a higher percentage [of blacks] were arrested and convicted of crimes and their sentences were more severe than those of whites charged with comparable offenses.” Vagrancy laws primarily targeted the large numbers of unemployed urban blacks in the years immediately following the Civil War. The Black Codes, many of which did not specifically mention race, regulated African-American life in the South in ways that ranged from prohibiting interacial rmarriage to barring blacks from selling liquor or owning firearms.

Blacks in southern cities also faced harsh geographic and economic discrimination, as they were largely confined to the poorest sections of cities. City councils would manipulate building codes to prevent specific types of homes from being built in certain areas. Tenements and lower quality homes were permitted in black areas, whereas sturdier homes were erected in white areas. Black neighborhoods also lacked streetlights, sewer systems, and basic sanitation, which made inhabitants more vulnerable to illness and health problems. Relegating blacks to the bottom of the economy also insured they would not be able to afford to live among whites. Rabinowitz finds that “the great mass of blacks were mired in low-paying, irregular, and low-status positions known as ‘negro jobs.’” Fearing economic competition, whites excluded blacks from skilled labor. Organized labor offered no help, either, because unions were afraid of alienating white workers. Yet economic poverty does not give a complete picture of the origins of segregation.

Rabinowitz finds that middle-class and even wealthy blacks, though relatively few in number, formed an essential part of the post-bellum order. For segregation to be effective, blacks needed a parallel system of commerce and finance. Whites supported the development of black banks, insurance companies, and merchants, so long as they did not threaten white businesses. Still, the development of a small black upper and middle class enabled blacks to invest in their own community, although this modest economic power was never enough to leverage real political gains. However, this parallel system reveals Rabinowitz’s most startling observation of the “separate but equal” construct: many blacks welcomed segregation because they viewed it as an improvement over slavery.

To be clear, Rabinowitz finds no evidence that blacks were content with Jim Crow. Some progress, though, was better than none, and a nominally separate but equal society offered more than the regime of exclusion that had defined slavery. “The professed policy of separate but equal,” Rabinowitz argues, “had the benefit of minimizing white hostility while still presenting the blacks with a significant improvement over their treatment at the hands of earlier administrations.” Segregation did not put blacks on equal footing with whites, but it did create spaces that bore less scrutiny. Black neighborhoods, for example, “brought together large numbers of negroes in areas that whites could not easily control.”

Blacks under the “separate but equal” regime nonetheless suffered frequent indignity and discrimination. While most explicit segregation laws were not passed until after 1890, “de facto segregation generally prevailed.” Streetcar owners in Nashville, for example, opted to provide segregated cars. Many hotels, theaters, and restaurants billed themselves as establishments for “ladies” and “gentlemen”, and excluded blacks altogether. After the passage of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, blacks were able to challenge these practices with some success, but none of these gains were profound. Violent attacks by lynch mobs or individual whites generally went unpunished and, though Rabinowitz finds that the former did not occur often in the first quarter century of the antebellum, the threat of this form of retribution was still a potent tool for controlling blacks.

Rabinowitz argues that, though demeaning and cruel, the hollow promise of “separate but equal” was the most that blacks could practically hope for in the first twenty-five years after the Civil War. “Given the opposition of southern whites, it seems unlikely that the Republicans, even if they had wanted to, could have forced integration on the South.” Despite the misgivings of many southern Republicans, and fierce resistance from Democrats, the military and the Freedman’s Bureau managed to enforce black suffrage in 1868. As a result, some cities elected black officials for the first time and blacks were also appointed to positions of patronage, but such gains were short lived. One of the reasons for the victory of the Redeemers was that Republicans would only go so far in supporting blacks for fear of alienating white voters. A prime example of this pattern was white republicans lackluster support of the 1875 Civil Rights Act. On occasion, disillusioned blacks even cast protest votes for Democrats to remind Republicans that they should not be taken for granted.

From the outset, Democrats looked for ways to limit blacks’ access to the ballot box. As long as the North or a robust Republican party maintained a presence, the Redemeers’ success could only be partial, but their efforts were tireless. Long before the end of Reconstruction, Redeemers sought to disenfranchise blacks through a “mixture of fraud, intimidation, and, most important, legislative manipulation.” Democrats at polling places frequently stuffed ballot boxes and disregarded republican ballots. White employers often threatened to fire black employees if they did not vote Democratic. But legislative manipulation was the most effective means of disenfranchising black voters.

Redeemer-controlled state legistlatures devised a seemingly endless list of strategies. The white primary became a staple of Southern states, as did gerrymandering. In 1870, Georgia switched to a ward system that insured white voting blocs would always outnumber that of blacks. Montgomery, Alabama convinced state legislators to reduce the boundaries of the city so that the black neighborhoods on the edge of town were no longer eligible to participate in local elections. Poll taxes, separate lines and ballot boxes, and complicated voting procedures were also part of the strategy to disenfranchise black voters. Rabinowitz concludes that, “the disenfranchisement of the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth century was the logical culmination of white thinking sense the onset of Reconstruction.”

Rabinowitz’s principal finding in Race Relations in the Urban South is that the seeds of Jim Crow had been planted before the ink of the thirteenth amendment was dry. The legal mechanisms of Reconstruction did nothing to diminish a deeply entrenched culture of white supremacy. Republicans in the South found that they could only offer limited support to blacks without alienating white voters. Still, for many blacks, segregation offered more opportunities than slavery, and the few blacks who grew comfortable in the late 19th century exploited these small advantages to invest in their own communities. In the end though, Reconstruction left blacks with weak protection while offering the Redeemers a series of shrinking hurdles.

[[Category:Nineteenth Century United States]]
[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Leon Litwack]]

Race Relations in the Urban South

2016-07-21T22:01:48Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Race Relations in the Urban South: 1865 - 1890
| author = Howard N. Rabinowitz
| publisher = Oxford University Press
| pub_date = 1978
| pages = 441
| isbn = 0195022831
[[File:Race_Relations_in_the_Urban_South.jpg|200px|thumb|left|alt text]]
}}
Race Relations in the Urban South traces the origins of segregation and the conceit of “separate but equal.” Rabinowitz finds that the influx of emancipated slaves into southern cities created new frictions among white democrats, white rebublicans, and newly-freed blacks. Segrgegation offered an uneasy compromise between the three parties. White democrats sought new ways to control blacks in lieu of slavery. Republicans strove to balance their appeal to white voters with a degree of support for blacks. Burgeoning black communities looked for whatever social and political gains they could find, and many viewed separation as an improvement over exclusion. “Separate but equal”, however, offered much more in theory than practice, and, by the end of the nineteenth century, most of what blacks gained during Reconstruction had been reversed.

The Thirteenth Amendment may have abolished slavery, but it did not erase the culture of white supremacy that justified it. White southerners commonly believed that black men and women had needed slavery to make them civilized. As large numbers of freed slaves migrated to southern cities, in which antebellum blacks had been scarce, whites look for different ways to keep them in check. A chief method was a legal system that held whites and blacks to different standards, even when race was not an explicit criterion of the the law. Rabinowitz argues that “a higher percentage [of blacks] were arrested and convicted of crimes and their sentences were more severe than those of whites charged with comparable offenses.” Vagrancy laws primarily targeted the large numbers of unemployed urban blacks in the years immediately following the Civil War. The Black Codes, many of which did not specifically mention race, regulated African-American life in the South in ways that ranged from prohibiting interacial rmarriage to barring blacks from selling liquor or owning firearms.

Blacks in southern cities also faced harsh geographic and economic discrimination, as they were largely confined to the poorest sections of cities. City councils would manipulate building codes to prevent specific types of homes from being built in certain areas. Tenements and lower quality homes were permitted in black areas, whereas sturdier homes were erected in white areas. Black neighborhoods also lacked streetlights, sewer systems, and basic sanitation, which made inhabitants more vulnerable to illness and health problems. Relegating blacks to the bottom of the economy also insured they would not be able to afford to live among whites. Rabinowitz finds that “the great mass of blacks were mired in low-paying, irregular, and low-status positions known as ‘negro jobs.’” Fearing economic competition, whites excluded blacks from skilled labor. Organized labor offered no help, either, because unions were afraid of alienating white workers. Yet economic poverty does not give a complete picture of the origins of segregation.

Rabinowitz finds that middle-class and even wealthy blacks, though relatively few in number, formed an essential part of the post-bellum order. For segregation to be effective, blacks needed a parallel system of commerce and finance. Whites supported the development of black banks, insurance companies, and merchants, so long as they did not threaten white businesses. Still, the development of a small black upper and middle class enabled blacks to invest in their own community, although this modest economic power was never enough to leverage real political gains. However, this parallel system reveals Rabinowitz’s most startling observation of the “separate but equal” construct: many blacks welcomed segregation because they viewed it as an improvement over slavery.

To be clear, Rabinowitz finds no evidence that blacks were content with Jim Crow. Some progress, though, was better than none, and a nominally separate but equal society offered more than the regime of exclusion that had defined slavery. “The professed policy of separate but equal,” Rabinowitz argues, “had the benefit of minimizing white hostility while still presenting the blacks with a significant improvement over their treatment at the hands of earlier administrations.” Segregation did not put blacks on equal footing with whites, but it did create spaces that bore less scrutiny. Black neighborhoods, for example, “brought together large numbers of negroes in areas that whites could not easily control.”

Blacks under the “separate but equal” regime nonetheless suffered frequent indignity and discrimination. While most explicit segregation laws were not passed until after 1890, “de facto segregation generally prevailed.” Streetcar owners in Nashville, for example, opted to provide segregated cars. Many hotels, theaters, and restaurants billed themselves as establishments for “ladies” and “gentlemen”, and excluded blacks altogether. After the passage of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, blacks were able to challenge these practices with some success, but none of these gains were profound. Violent attacks by lynch mobs or individual whites generally went unpunished and, though Rabinowitz finds that the former did not occur often in the first quarter century of the antebellum, the threat of this form of retribution was still a potent tool for controlling blacks.

Rabinowitz argues that, though demeaning and cruel, the hollow promise of “separate but equal” was the most that blacks could practically hope for in the first twenty-five years after the Civil War. “Given the opposition of southern whites, it seems unlikely that the Republicans, even if they had wanted to, could have forced integration on the South.” Despite the misgivings of many southern Republicans, and fierce resistance from Democrats, the military and the Freedman’s Bureau managed to enforce black suffrage in 1868. As a result, some cities elected black officials for the first time and blacks were also appointed to positions of patronage, but such gains were short lived. One of the reasons for the victory of the Redeemers was that Republicans would only go so far in supporting blacks for fear of alienating white voters. A prime example of this pattern was white republicans lackluster support of the 1875 Civil Rights Act. On occasion, disillusioned blacks even cast protest votes for Democrats to remind Republicans that they should not be taken for granted.

From the outset, Democrats looked for ways to limit blacks’ access to the ballot box. As long as the North or a robust Republican party maintained a presence, the Redemeers’ success could only be partial, but their efforts were tireless. Long before the end of Reconstruction, Redeemers sought to disenfranchise blacks through a “mixture of fraud, intimidation, and, most important, legislative manipulation.” Democrats at polling places frequently stuffed ballot boxes and disregarded republican ballots. White employers often threatened to fire black employees if they did not vote Democratic. But legislative manipulation was the most effective means of disenfranchising black voters.

Redeemer-controlled state legistlatures devised a seemingly endless list of strategies. The white primary became a staple of Southern states, as did gerrymandering. In 1870, Georgia switched to a ward system that insured white voting blocs would always outnumber that of blacks. Montgomery, Alabama convinced state legislators to reduce the boundaries of the city so that the black neighborhoods on the edge of town were no longer eligible to participate in local elections. Poll taxes, separate lines and ballot boxes, and complicated voting procedures were also part of the strategy to disenfranchise black voters. Rabinowitz concludes that, “the disenfranchisement of the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth century was the logical culmination of white thinking sense the onset of Reconstruction.”

Rabinowitz’s principal finding in Race Relations in the Urban South is that the seeds of Jim Crow had been planted before the ink of the thirteenth amendment was dry. The legal mechanisms of Reconstruction did nothing to diminish a deeply entrenched culture of white supremacy. Republicans in the South found that they could only offer limited support to blacks without alienating white voters. Still, for many blacks, segregation offered more opportunities than slavery, and the few blacks who grew comfortable in the late 19th century exploited these small advantages to invest in their own communities. In the end though, Reconstruction left blacks with weak protection while offering the Redeemers a series of shrinking hurdles.

[[Category:Nineteenth Century United States]]
[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Leon Litwack]]

Race Relations in the Urban South

2016-07-21T22:00:36Z

Ueberaffe:

{{Infobox book
| name = Race Relations in the Urban South: 1865 - 1890
| author = Howard N. Rabinowitz
| publisher = Oxford University Press
| pub_date = 1978
| pages = 441
| isbn = 0195022831
[[File:File.png|200px|thumb|left|alt text]]
}}
Race Relations in the Urban South traces the origins of segregation and the conceit of “separate but equal.” Rabinowitz finds that the influx of emancipated slaves into southern cities created new frictions among white democrats, white rebublicans, and newly-freed blacks. Segrgegation offered an uneasy compromise between the three parties. White democrats sought new ways to control blacks in lieu of slavery. Republicans strove to balance their appeal to white voters with a degree of support for blacks. Burgeoning black communities looked for whatever social and political gains they could find, and many viewed separation as an improvement over exclusion. “Separate but equal”, however, offered much more in theory than practice, and, by the end of the nineteenth century, most of what blacks gained during Reconstruction had been reversed.

The Thirteenth Amendment may have abolished slavery, but it did not erase the culture of white supremacy that justified it. White southerners commonly believed that black men and women had needed slavery to make them civilized. As large numbers of freed slaves migrated to southern cities, in which antebellum blacks had been scarce, whites look for different ways to keep them in check. A chief method was a legal system that held whites and blacks to different standards, even when race was not an explicit criterion of the the law. Rabinowitz argues that “a higher percentage [of blacks] were arrested and convicted of crimes and their sentences were more severe than those of whites charged with comparable offenses.” Vagrancy laws primarily targeted the large numbers of unemployed urban blacks in the years immediately following the Civil War. The Black Codes, many of which did not specifically mention race, regulated African-American life in the South in ways that ranged from prohibiting interacial rmarriage to barring blacks from selling liquor or owning firearms.

Blacks in southern cities also faced harsh geographic and economic discrimination, as they were largely confined to the poorest sections of cities. City councils would manipulate building codes to prevent specific types of homes from being built in certain areas. Tenements and lower quality homes were permitted in black areas, whereas sturdier homes were erected in white areas. Black neighborhoods also lacked streetlights, sewer systems, and basic sanitation, which made inhabitants more vulnerable to illness and health problems. Relegating blacks to the bottom of the economy also insured they would not be able to afford to live among whites. Rabinowitz finds that “the great mass of blacks were mired in low-paying, irregular, and low-status positions known as ‘negro jobs.’” Fearing economic competition, whites excluded blacks from skilled labor. Organized labor offered no help, either, because unions were afraid of alienating white workers. Yet economic poverty does not give a complete picture of the origins of segregation.

Rabinowitz finds that middle-class and even wealthy blacks, though relatively few in number, formed an essential part of the post-bellum order. For segregation to be effective, blacks needed a parallel system of commerce and finance. Whites supported the development of black banks, insurance companies, and merchants, so long as they did not threaten white businesses. Still, the development of a small black upper and middle class enabled blacks to invest in their own community, although this modest economic power was never enough to leverage real political gains. However, this parallel system reveals Rabinowitz’s most startling observation of the “separate but equal” construct: many blacks welcomed segregation because they viewed it as an improvement over slavery.

To be clear, Rabinowitz finds no evidence that blacks were content with Jim Crow. Some progress, though, was better than none, and a nominally separate but equal society offered more than the regime of exclusion that had defined slavery. “The professed policy of separate but equal,” Rabinowitz argues, “had the benefit of minimizing white hostility while still presenting the blacks with a significant improvement over their treatment at the hands of earlier administrations.” Segregation did not put blacks on equal footing with whites, but it did create spaces that bore less scrutiny. Black neighborhoods, for example, “brought together large numbers of negroes in areas that whites could not easily control.”

Blacks under the “separate but equal” regime nonetheless suffered frequent indignity and discrimination. While most explicit segregation laws were not passed until after 1890, “de facto segregation generally prevailed.” Streetcar owners in Nashville, for example, opted to provide segregated cars. Many hotels, theaters, and restaurants billed themselves as establishments for “ladies” and “gentlemen”, and excluded blacks altogether. After the passage of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, blacks were able to challenge these practices with some success, but none of these gains were profound. Violent attacks by lynch mobs or individual whites generally went unpunished and, though Rabinowitz finds that the former did not occur often in the first quarter century of the antebellum, the threat of this form of retribution was still a potent tool for controlling blacks.

Rabinowitz argues that, though demeaning and cruel, the hollow promise of “separate but equal” was the most that blacks could practically hope for in the first twenty-five years after the Civil War. “Given the opposition of southern whites, it seems unlikely that the Republicans, even if they had wanted to, could have forced integration on the South.” Despite the misgivings of many southern Republicans, and fierce resistance from Democrats, the military and the Freedman’s Bureau managed to enforce black suffrage in 1868. As a result, some cities elected black officials for the first time and blacks were also appointed to positions of patronage, but such gains were short lived. One of the reasons for the victory of the Redeemers was that Republicans would only go so far in supporting blacks for fear of alienating white voters. A prime example of this pattern was white republicans lackluster support of the 1875 Civil Rights Act. On occasion, disillusioned blacks even cast protest votes for Democrats to remind Republicans that they should not be taken for granted.

From the outset, Democrats looked for ways to limit blacks’ access to the ballot box. As long as the North or a robust Republican party maintained a presence, the Redemeers’ success could only be partial, but their efforts were tireless. Long before the end of Reconstruction, Redeemers sought to disenfranchise blacks through a “mixture of fraud, intimidation, and, most important, legislative manipulation.” Democrats at polling places frequently stuffed ballot boxes and disregarded republican ballots. White employers often threatened to fire black employees if they did not vote Democratic. But legislative manipulation was the most effective means of disenfranchising black voters.

Redeemer-controlled state legistlatures devised a seemingly endless list of strategies. The white primary became a staple of Southern states, as did gerrymandering. In 1870, Georgia switched to a ward system that insured white voting blocs would always outnumber that of blacks. Montgomery, Alabama convinced state legislators to reduce the boundaries of the city so that the black neighborhoods on the edge of town were no longer eligible to participate in local elections. Poll taxes, separate lines and ballot boxes, and complicated voting procedures were also part of the strategy to disenfranchise black voters. Rabinowitz concludes that, “the disenfranchisement of the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth century was the logical culmination of white thinking sense the onset of Reconstruction.”

Rabinowitz’s principal finding in Race Relations in the Urban South is that the seeds of Jim Crow had been planted before the ink of the thirteenth amendment was dry. The legal mechanisms of Reconstruction did nothing to diminish a deeply entrenched culture of white supremacy. Republicans in the South found that they could only offer limited support to blacks without alienating white voters. Still, for many blacks, segregation offered more opportunities than slavery, and the few blacks who grew comfortable in the late 19th century exploited these small advantages to invest in their own communities. In the end though, Reconstruction left blacks with weak protection while offering the Redeemers a series of shrinking hurdles.

[[Category:Nineteenth Century United States]]
[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Leon Litwack]]

File:Race Relations in the Urban South.jpg

2016-07-21T21:59:19Z

Ueberaffe:

Race Relations in the Urban South

2016-07-21T21:55:19Z

Ueberaffe: Created page with "{{Infobox book | name = Race Relations in the Urban South: 1865 - 1890 | author = Howard N. Rabinowitz | publisher = Oxford University Press | pub_date = 1..."

{{Infobox book
| name = Race Relations in the Urban South: 1865 - 1890
| author = Howard N. Rabinowitz
| publisher = Oxford University Press
| pub_date = 1978
| pages = 441
| isbn = 0195022831
[[File:Name of File.jpg|150px|alt=image]]
}}
Race Relations in the Urban South traces the origins of segregation and the conceit of “separate but equal.” Rabinowitz finds that the influx of emancipated slaves into southern cities created new frictions among white democrats, white rebublicans, and newly-freed blacks. Segrgegation offered an uneasy compromise between the three parties. White democrats sought new ways to control blacks in lieu of slavery. Republicans strove to balance their appeal to white voters with a degree of support for blacks. Burgeoning black communities looked for whatever social and political gains they could find, and many viewed separation as an improvement over exclusion. “Separate but equal”, however, offered much more in theory than practice, and, by the end of the nineteenth century, most of what blacks gained during Reconstruction had been reversed.

The Thirteenth Amendment may have abolished slavery, but it did not erase the culture of white supremacy that justified it. White southerners commonly believed that black men and women had needed slavery to make them civilized. As large numbers of freed slaves migrated to southern cities, in which antebellum blacks had been scarce, whites look for different ways to keep them in check. A chief method was a legal system that held whites and blacks to different standards, even when race was not an explicit criterion of the the law. Rabinowitz argues that “a higher percentage [of blacks] were arrested and convicted of crimes and their sentences were more severe than those of whites charged with comparable offenses.” Vagrancy laws primarily targeted the large numbers of unemployed urban blacks in the years immediately following the Civil War. The Black Codes, many of which did not specifically mention race, regulated African-American life in the South in ways that ranged from prohibiting interacial rmarriage to barring blacks from selling liquor or owning firearms.

Blacks in southern cities also faced harsh geographic and economic discrimination, as they were largely confined to the poorest sections of cities. City councils would manipulate building codes to prevent specific types of homes from being built in certain areas. Tenements and lower quality homes were permitted in black areas, whereas sturdier homes were erected in white areas. Black neighborhoods also lacked streetlights, sewer systems, and basic sanitation, which made inhabitants more vulnerable to illness and health problems. Relegating blacks to the bottom of the economy also insured they would not be able to afford to live among whites. Rabinowitz finds that “the great mass of blacks were mired in low-paying, irregular, and low-status positions known as ‘negro jobs.’” Fearing economic competition, whites excluded blacks from skilled labor. Organized labor offered no help, either, because unions were afraid of alienating white workers. Yet economic poverty does not give a complete picture of the origins of segregation.

Rabinowitz finds that middle-class and even wealthy blacks, though relatively few in number, formed an essential part of the post-bellum order. For segregation to be effective, blacks needed a parallel system of commerce and finance. Whites supported the development of black banks, insurance companies, and merchants, so long as they did not threaten white businesses. Still, the development of a small black upper and middle class enabled blacks to invest in their own community, although this modest economic power was never enough to leverage real political gains. However, this parallel system reveals Rabinowitz’s most startling observation of the “separate but equal” construct: many blacks welcomed segregation because they viewed it as an improvement over slavery.

To be clear, Rabinowitz finds no evidence that blacks were content with Jim Crow. Some progress, though, was better than none, and a nominally separate but equal society offered more than the regime of exclusion that had defined slavery. “The professed policy of separate but equal,” Rabinowitz argues, “had the benefit of minimizing white hostility while still presenting the blacks with a significant improvement over their treatment at the hands of earlier administrations.” Segregation did not put blacks on equal footing with whites, but it did create spaces that bore less scrutiny. Black neighborhoods, for example, “brought together large numbers of negroes in areas that whites could not easily control.”

Blacks under the “separate but equal” regime nonetheless suffered frequent indignity and discrimination. While most explicit segregation laws were not passed until after 1890, “de facto segregation generally prevailed.” Streetcar owners in Nashville, for example, opted to provide segregated cars. Many hotels, theaters, and restaurants billed themselves as establishments for “ladies” and “gentlemen”, and excluded blacks altogether. After the passage of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, blacks were able to challenge these practices with some success, but none of these gains were profound. Violent attacks by lynch mobs or individual whites generally went unpunished and, though Rabinowitz finds that the former did not occur often in the first quarter century of the antebellum, the threat of this form of retribution was still a potent tool for controlling blacks.

Rabinowitz argues that, though demeaning and cruel, the hollow promise of “separate but equal” was the most that blacks could practically hope for in the first twenty-five years after the Civil War. “Given the opposition of southern whites, it seems unlikely that the Republicans, even if they had wanted to, could have forced integration on the South.” Despite the misgivings of many southern Republicans, and fierce resistance from Democrats, the military and the Freedman’s Bureau managed to enforce black suffrage in 1868. As a result, some cities elected black officials for the first time and blacks were also appointed to positions of patronage, but such gains were short lived. One of the reasons for the victory of the Redeemers was that Republicans would only go so far in supporting blacks for fear of alienating white voters. A prime example of this pattern was white republicans lackluster support of the 1875 Civil Rights Act. On occasion, disillusioned blacks even cast protest votes for Democrats to remind Republicans that they should not be taken for granted.

From the outset, Democrats looked for ways to limit blacks’ access to the ballot box. As long as the North or a robust Republican party maintained a presence, the Redemeers’ success could only be partial, but their efforts were tireless. Long before the end of Reconstruction, Redeemers sought to disenfranchise blacks through a “mixture of fraud, intimidation, and, most important, legislative manipulation.” Democrats at polling places frequently stuffed ballot boxes and disregarded republican ballots. White employers often threatened to fire black employees if they did not vote Democratic. But legislative manipulation was the most effective means of disenfranchising black voters.

Redeemer-controlled state legistlatures devised a seemingly endless list of strategies. The white primary became a staple of Southern states, as did gerrymandering. In 1870, Georgia switched to a ward system that insured white voting blocs would always outnumber that of blacks. Montgomery, Alabama convinced state legislators to reduce the boundaries of the city so that the black neighborhoods on the edge of town were no longer eligible to participate in local elections. Poll taxes, separate lines and ballot boxes, and complicated voting procedures were also part of the strategy to disenfranchise black voters. Rabinowitz concludes that, “the disenfranchisement of the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth century was the logical culmination of white thinking sense the onset of Reconstruction.”

Rabinowitz’s principal finding in Race Relations in the Urban South is that the seeds of Jim Crow had been planted before the ink of the thirteenth amendment was dry. The legal mechanisms of Reconstruction did nothing to diminish a deeply entrenched culture of white supremacy. Republicans in the South found that they could only offer limited support to blacks without alienating white voters. Still, for many blacks, segregation offered more opportunities than slavery, and the few blacks who grew comfortable in the late 19th century exploited these small advantages to invest in their own communities. In the end though, Reconstruction left blacks with weak protection while offering the Redeemers a series of shrinking hurdles.

[[Category:Nineteenth Century United States]]
[[Category:Wikify]]
[[Category:Book Summaries]]
[[Category:Leon Litwack]]

Nineteeth Century United States

2016-07-21T21:49:13Z

Ueberaffe: /* Book Summaries */

North of Slavery

2016-07-01T15:08:48Z

Ueberaffe: